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Preface 
In preparing the present report, your Rapporteur has been extremely fortunate to receive much kind 
help and assistance from all the authorities consulted and he would like to take this opportunity publicly to 
thank: all concerned for their co-operation. 
The Rapporteur met or received evidence from the following: 
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His Excellency Juan Cassiers Belgian Ambassador to Washington 
Mr. James Timbie Senior Advisor of Undersecretary of State for International Security 
Mr. Stephen Hadley 
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Mr. Robert Einhorn 
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski 
Mr. Dean Millot 
General Brent Scowcroft 
Mr. Steven Andreasen 
Mr. Steven Cambone 
Dr. John Steinbruner 
Mr. Andy Johnson 
Mr. Brett O'Brien 
Mrs. Eliane Bunn 
8th Aprill994 - London 
Mr. Jonathan Eyal 
Mr. David Omand 
13th Aprill994 - Paris 
Mr. Alexandre Orlov 
MM. Jean-Charles Gaudillet 
and Bruno Tertrais 
Mr. Martin Harry 
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Former Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Policy 
Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, State Department 
Former National Security Advisor, Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies 
Rand Corporation 
Former National Security Advisor, Forum for International Policy 
Deputy of the Senior Director for Defence Policy/Arms Control, National 
Security Council 
Senior Fellow- Politico-Military Affairs, Centre for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies 
Director Foreign Policy, Brookings Institute 
Legislative Assistant to Senator Exon, Armed Services Committee 
Defence and Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Mitchell 
Principal Director for Forces Policy, Department of Defence 
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies 
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Policy, Ministry of Defence 
Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Russia, Paris 
Department of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defence 
Director Strategic Affairs, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
28th-29th Aprill994- Moscow 
His Excellency Baron Belgian Ambassador to Moscow 
Thierry de Gruben 
Mr. Alexander Yereskovsky 
Mr. Bachkirov 
Mr. B. Kazantsev 
Professor Sergei Karaganov 
Gen. Major Pavel Zolotarev 
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Mr. Sergei Oznobichev 
Mr. Alekseji Arbatov 
Minister Plenipotentiary, Senior Counsellor, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
Head Counsellor, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
Minister Plenipotentiary, Assistant Director Department for Co-operation 
in Europe, Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
Institute of Europe 
Ministry of Defence 
Gorbachev Foundation 
Institute of the United States of America and Canada 
Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the r6le and future of nuclear weapons 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the large reductions in both the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals as a conse-
quence of the START I and START II treaties and the end of the cold war; 
(ii) Conscious that START I and START II will not be fully implemented before the year 2003; 
(iii) Noting that the United States is at present making a full reassessment of its nuclear posture and is 
showing true political determination to prepare a new reduction in strategic arsenals in the framework of 
a future START ill treaty; 
(iv) Noting, however, that Russia, for its part, is increasingly tempted, mainly due to the decline of its 
conventional forces, to make its strategic nuclear capability the centrepiece of its defence policy; 
(v) Assessing present political instability in Russia and the former Soviet republics and the ensuing 
dangers; 
(vi) Noting that there are still doubts about whether Russia really wishes to ratify and implement the 
START II treaty; 
(vii) Noting that, notwithstanding the end of the cold war and the signing of the historic nuclear arms 
reduction treaties, the mutual relationship of deterrence between Russia and the western nuclear powers is 
still topical, including the possibility of first-use of nuclear weapons which is still the keystone of the doc-
trine of deterrence everywhere; 
(viii) Noting that, notwithstanding recent efforts to establish confidence between the former cold war 
adversaries at the level of political leaders and experts, there is still an astonishing lack of reciprocal confi-
dence, wish for transparency and mutual understanding in many other circles; 
(ix) Conscious that if greater account is not taken of lingering suspicions, prejudices and fundamental 
differences in military doctrines and diverging interests in foreign policy, the establishment of new rela-
tionships of security, stability and confidence between the members of the Atlantic Alliance on the one 
hand and of the Russian Federation on the other may be jeopardised; 
(x) Hoping, in this respect, that Russia will agree to join the partnership for peace proposal proposed by 
the Atlantic Alliance; 
(xi) Welcoming the bilateral agreements reached between the United States and Russia and the United 
Kingdom and Russia to detarget nuclear arms, even if the value of these agreements is symbolic rather 
than intrinsic; 
( xii) Believing that other measures, such as taking most strategic missiles off alert status and separating 
nuclear warheads from their missiles should be envisaged; 
(xiii) Expressing in general the wish that the theory of mutual assured destruction (MAD) should be 
replaced by a policy of mutual assured co-operation (MAC); 
(xiv) Noting that it would be totally illogical to start the implementation of a European common foreign 
and security policy (CFSP) including the framing by WEU of a common defence policy " which might in 
time lead to a common defence " without closely examining the rOle of the French and British nuclear 
forces in the definition of a common defence policy of the European Union; 
(xv) Welcoming the work of the permanent Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and 
Doctrine which among other things has confirmed that there are many points of convergence in the assess-
ments made by the two countries; 
(xvi) Aware that the existence of a formidable nuclear arsenal in Russia continues to determine the struc-
ture and deployment of the nuclear forces of France, the United Kingdom and the United States; 
(xvii) Noting that, regarding proliferation, there are doubts about whether the possession of nuclear wea-
pons by the official nuclear weapon states plays a role in deterring third countries from procuring their 
own nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction; 
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(xviii) Recognising that, particularly in the United States, the weight of nuclear deterrence as a means of 
preventing war tends to diminish while extended nuclear deterrence is also losing credibility; 
(xix) Noting that the 700 United States B-61 nuclear gravity bombs remaining in Europe after NATO's 
October 1991 decision play a purely political and symbolic role; 
(xx) Noting that, increasingly, nuclear deterrence in circumstances today is truly credible only if the vital 
interests of a nation or group of nations are under direct threat from the power to be deterred; 
(xxi) Noting that, in regard to the common security policy of the European Union and in the framework 
ofWEU, a study should be made on what France and the United Kingdom consider to be their vital inter-
ests which are protected by their nuclear means; 
(xxii) Regretting that there is not sufficient cohesion in the defence policies of European countries and, 
despite bold general declarations, there is not yet cohesion and understanding between our countries regar-
ding the development and future of their strategic relationship with Russia, although this would be indis-
pensable for introducing any lasting system of security in Europe; 
(xxiii) Welcoming the granting of associate status to the Central European countries of the Forum of 
Consultation; 
(xxiv) Emphasising, however, that WEU's policy of stronger security links with its Central European part-
ners will contribute little to Europe's security if it is not accompanied by frequent political and military 
consultations with Russia and the other European republics of the CIS aiming at the establishment of a 
strategic relationship based on a thorough understanding of, and respect for mutual interests; 
( xxv) Noting that it is of the greatest importance to intensify and further improve international co-opera-
tion in the struggle against proliferation, in particular by extending the non-proliferation treaty in 1995, 
improving the missile technology control regime and establishing a follow-up organisation with extended 
membership as a successor to Cocom; 
(xxvi) Aware that none of these existing or future non-proliferation regimes can guarantee that a country 
with sufficient financial resources and zeal will not acquire ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruc-
tion; 
(xxvii)Noting that there is an urgent need for a coherent and co-ordinated policy among official nuclear 
weapon states to cover contingencies in which a proliferant third country might threaten to use a nuclear 
weapon; 
(xxviii) Recognising that there is a need to define a coherent European counter-proliferation policy, 
drawing inspiration from the discussions which are already being held in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance following the recent United States initiative; 
(xxix) Recalling the results of the Assembly's Rome symposium on anti-missile defence for Europe (20th-
21st April1993) and in particular the Assembly's recommendation that the Council decide on the basis of 
a careful risk assessment whether and to what extent it will be necessary to mandate European industry to 
conduct a feasibility study regarding the requirements for a cost-effective anti-missile protection system 
for Europe; 
(xxx) Taking note of the fact that the WEU Council, in its reply to Recommendation 540, has pointed out 
that nuclear questions are not, at the present time, on its agenda; 
(xxxi) Insisting, however, that the preceding considerations should be an incentive to redefine the rOle of 
nuclear weapons for the security of Europe, realising that they canfiot be disinvented and, if only for that 
reason, they will continue to be deployed and will continue to play an important role in the foreseeable 
future in international relations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Establish a strategic study group within WEU: 
- to examine the role and future of nuclear weapons for European security including the different 
aspects of intra-European extended nuclear deterrence; 
- to examine the role all the WEU member states might play in defining a future European nuclear 
strategy; 
- then to study the possibility of creating a nuclear co-ordination body within WEU; 
- to examine the military aspects of an active European counter-proliferation policy; 
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- to examine the possibilities of Europe helping the CIS to dismantle its excess nuclear warheads 
following the bilateral agreements and unilateral decisions reached between the United States 
and the republics of the CIS which possess nuclear weapons; 
2. Take steps to intensify relations with the European republics of the CIS, in particular Russia and 
Ukraine, in particular to ensure that the definition of a European defence identity does not arouse new sus-
picion or provoke reactions which might run counter to the fmal goal of creating a collective European 
security order; 
3. Ensure that the abovementioned initiatives are pursued in an atmosphere of absolute transparency 
with Western Europe's North American allies in order to make certain that they support the development 
of a European security and defence identity. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submUted by Mr. De Decker, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The cold war that arose from the confronta-
tion between hostile ideologies and the conse-
quent formation of two opposing power blocs 
drew the world into a massive arms race. Rivalry 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the 
nuclear sector led to mindless escalation with each 
bloc having the ability to annihilate its potential 
adversary many times over. Deterrence was based 
on a balance of United States and Soviet forces 
and the theory of mutual assured destruction 
(aptly abbreviated in English to MAD). 
2. In a context of such lunacy where each side 
sought to terrorise the other, the United States and 
the Soviet Union had each at one point over 
30 000 nuclear warheads, with a total energy yield 
at their highest levels of 30 000 megatons, the 
equivalent of 2.5 million Hiroshima bombs! 
3. Fortunately, with the ending of the cold war 
and the tearing down of the iron curtain, signature 
of the INF, START I and START IT treaties has 
become possible, together with numerous unilateral 
reductions in nuclear arsenals. These, if ratified and 
implemented in good faith, could reduce stockpiles 
to more reasonable proportions and open the way 
for negotiation of further disarmament treaties. Or 
is this perhaps too much to hope for? 
4. Will the political evolution of Russia - in 
the throes of political and social instability that 
constantly threaten to erupt in violence- allow the 
present disarmament process to continue? The 
answer to this essential question will in any event 
determine the attitude of all the other official 
nuclear powers. 
5. The present massive disarmament raises the 
acutely sensitive issue of storage of nuclear 
warheads and reprocessing of fissile material. 
Should management of this issue not be the major 
priority for the world at large and Europe in parti-
cular? 
6. The reduction of the arsenals of the official 
nuclear powers does not however settle the difficult 
issue of nuclear proliferation in other regions of the 
world, often close to Europe. Is our current policy of 
non- or counter-proliferation really effective? 
7. It is in this context, characterised at one and 
the same time by major hopes and risks that the 
European Union has decided to develop a com-
mon foreign and security policy (CFSP) involving 
definition in the longer term of a common defence 
policy " which might in time lead to a common 
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defence ". Is definition of a European defence 
identity possible without the European Union 
defining a future European nuclear deterrence 
strategy? 
8. The present report, which does not claim to 
be exhaustive, describes the recent evolution of 
nuclear armaments policy and in particular the 
extent to which European security is affected by 
it. It goes without saying that the major players in 
this area are the United States and Russia. The 
present report makes no reference to the nuclear 
forces and doctrine of China insofar as, for the 
time being, they do not seem to influence Euro-
pean security other than through their possible 
impact on Russian nuclear policy. Your Rappor-
teur wishes to thank the Belgian Ambassadors to 
Washington and Moscow, His Excellency Juan 
Cassiers and His Excellency Baron Thierry de 
Gruben and their colleagues for kindly helping to 
organise meetings in the two capitals. 
9. The present report will draw some conclu-
sions and make certain recommendations. 
10. Your Rapporteur does not claim to have a 
definitive answer to these particularly complex 
and sensitive problems. He is however convinced 
that European governments, the European institu-
tions and WEU in particular cannot continue to 
ignore the profound changes that have taken place 
in nuclear deterrence and that it is incumbent 
upon these institutions to have the courage to 
develop an active European policy to combat pro-
liferation and a policy for processing the very 
large numbers of warheads now present on the 
continent of Europe and western Asia. Your 
Rapporteur is convinced that the European Union 
and its military arm, WEU, must initiate discus-
sion on the definition of future European nuclear 
deterrence, in the framework of the development 
of the common foreign and security policy 
(CFSP). 
II. The evolution of the United States 
and NATO's nuclear strategy 
11. After using its first nuclear bomb in Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki in 1945, the United States 
took a long time in developing a strategic theory 
related to nuclear weapons 1• Initially, the admi-
1. Main sources for this chapter have been: Lawrence Freed-
man, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Second Edition, 
London 1989; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Contain-
ment, New York 1982. 
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nistration was reluctant to make the bomb a cen-
trepiece of United States strategy because of the 
unwillingness to see it as "just another weapon, 
ready for use ". Rather, it considered the nuclear 
bomb as a weapon of" last resort ". 
12. Only when the Berlin crisis began in mid-
1948, did the National Security Council start dis-
cussing the advisability of formulating policies on 
the use of nuclear weapons. 
13. In any case, from the beginning, there was 
certainly no taboo on the possible use of the bomb 
and terror-bombing of cities was indeed consi-
dered the most appropriate use. 
14. After the conclusion of the North Atlantic 
Treaty in 1949, NATO first adopted a forward 
strategy aimed at holding any Soviet offensive as 
close to the original lines as possible. It was 
thought that United States nuclear forces would 
do little more than neutralise those of the other 
side and that in a war the advantage would have to 
be won with conventional arms. 
15. In September 1950, President Truman 
approved a document presented by the National 
Security Council (NSC-68), on the objectives and 
strategic plans of the United States, keeping 
account of a Soviet nuclear capability. This docu-
ment concluded that until conventional forces had 
been built up, the United States had no choice but 
to rely on its nuclear arsenal. A policy of no-first-
use was rejected because that " would be interpre-
ted by the USSR as an admission of great weak-
ness and by our allies as a clear indication that we 
intended to abandon them ". 
16. In December of that same year, Under-
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, emphasised 
that " the principal antagonist of the United States 
was the Soviet Union" hence the consequent 
necessity of defending Great Britain, Western 
Europe and the Mediterranean for " if we did not 
hold these parts of the world, we were likely to 
have no platform from which to operate if we had 
to against the Soviet Union and we would turn 
great potential strength to the other side ". 
17. It should be mentioned here that in the early 
1950s, investigations were made into tactical 
nuclear weapons with which it was claimed, 
" battle could be brought back to the battlefield". 
Such weapons, however, were seen as supple-
ments rather than alternatives to strategic bom-
bing. 
18. The Eisenhower administration, in January 
1954, outlined the doctrine of" massive retalia-
tion ", which meant that the United States was to 
" depend primarily upon a great capacity to reta-
liate, instantly, by means and at places of our own 
choosing". When this was wrongly assumed to be 
an " undiscriminating threat to respond to any 
communist-inspired aggression anywhere, how-
ever marginal the confrontation, by means of a 
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massive nuclear strike against the centres of the 
Soviet Union and China", the Secretary of State, 
John Foster Dulles, repudiated the notion that the 
United States" intended to rely wholly on large-
scale strategic bombing as the sole means to deter 
and counter aggression". It was only one of a 
wide variety of means available for responding to 
aggression. It should not be stated in advance pre-
cisely what would be the scope of military action 
if new aggression occurred, a posture which later 
became known as " brinkmanship ". 
19. The principle on which this doctrine was 
based was deterrence, meaning that the behaviour 
of a potential enemy could be manipulated 
through threats. 
20. By this time, the United States had a vast 
range of nuclear weapons at its disposal, from 
strategic to tactical battlefield weapons. President 
Eisenhower even declared in a press conference in 
March 1955: "Where these things are used on 
strictly military targets and for strictly military 
purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be 
used just exactly as you would use a bullet or any-
thing else. " 
21. Earlier in a National Security Council 
Paper (NSC-162/2) on basic security policy, it had 
been clearly been stated that: " In the event of 
hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear 
weapons to be as available for use as other muni-
tions. " Field Marshal! Montgomery, then Deputy 
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (DSA-
CEUR), explained in late 1954: " I want to make 
it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all 
our planning on using atomic and thermonuclear 
weapons in our defence. With us it is no longer: 
' They may possibly be used.' It is very definite-
ly: ' They will be used, if we are attacked '. " 
22. In practice, the war in Indo-China showed 
that the United States did not decide easily on the 
actual use of nuclear weapons. 
23. Also, it was increasingly suggested that the 
doctrine of massive retaliation was not always 
credible and that it might lead to a choice between 
" holocaust or humiliation " which did not really 
seem to be realistic. Gradually, the notion was 
sinking in that for a strategy of deterrence to be 
credible, the means of deterrence should be pro-
portionate to the objectives at stake. At the same 
time, the possibility of limited war in " grey " 
areas (disputed territories between East and West) 
had to be considered, since clearly the United 
States no longer had a nuclear monopoly and 
because nuclear parity with the Soviet Union 
where it would no longer be possible to impose 
unconditional surrender, at an acceptable cost, 
was coming into sight. 
24. As regards the employment of what were 
called tactical nuclear weapons, it became clear 
that they could not be used in such a discrimina-
ting manner as to spare civilians. This meant that, 
as a defensive weapon, they could only be used 
early in a conflict before the invading forces had 
captured much territory. Grave doubts were soon 
cast on the notion that they could be considered to 
be virtually tactical. 
25. It was realised that the use of tactical 
nuclear weapons would always be a strategic 
decision to be taken at the highest level and if not 
" weapons of last resort " they would be of 
" penultimate resort ". Considerable efforts were 
also made in order to establish convincing demar-
cation lines between tactical and strategic use of 
nuclear weapons. 
26. At the end of the 1950s, however, most 
strategists understood that the idea of a limited 
war with the use of tactical nuclear weapons was 
virtually a contradiction in terms. The armed ser-
vices were not able to develop a coherent doctrine 
for tactical nuclear weapons and also within 
NATO there were disagreements over the use of 
these weapons. 
27. In fact, the development and deployment of 
tactical nuclear weapons was encouraged before 
an appropriate doctrine had been evolved. NATO 
could not ignore them once the Warsaw Pact had 
acquired such weapons, but the contingencies in 
which the West should initiate their use remained 
unclear. It can be noted now that the final conse-
quences of the early arguments over the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons were drawn only in the 
1990s. 
28. As Soviet nuclear power steadily grew 
towards a level equal to that of the United States, 
creating a balance of terror, calls for a preventive 
war were heard but were immediately dismissed. 
On the other hand, the possibility of a pre-emptive 
war, of being the first to strike if there were posi-
tive evidence that an attack was being mounted 
against the United States, was more seriously dis-
cussed, but it was never officially adopted as a 
potential strategy. 
29. In 1955, the United States Air Force Asso-
ciation argued that massive retaliation as a deter-
rent to war was steadily becoming obsolete. It 
stated that there could be no practical retaliation 
after an all-out surprise attack with thermonuclear 
weapons which would destroy military bases 
simultaneously with centres of industry and popu-
lation. 
30. At an early stage (H. Kahn, 1960), it was 
also suggested that credibility depended on being 
willing to accept the other side's retaliatory blow. 
31. Meanwhile, the Rand Corporation had 
made it clear that air force bases were far more 
vulnerable to a surprise enemy attack than had 
previously been thought. They also introduced the 
concept of first -strike force (the opening volley of 
a nuclear war, directed against the nuclear capabi-
9 
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lity of the enemy with the intention of crippling 
his means of retaliation) and second strike force 
(capable of ensuring effective retaliation even 
after absorbing an enemy's first strike). 
32. By 1956, the United States administration 
had begun to come to terms with the balance of 
terror and in August of that same year, a doctrine 
of " sufficiency " was developed, which meant 
that a force was required to perform the essential 
retaliatory mission. War was called an" unthink-
able catastrophe " from which neither side could 
hope to escape by a margin of superiority in deli-
very systems. 
33. The launch of the first artificial earth satel-
lite, Sputnik I, by the Soviet Union in October 
1957, a clear demonstration of Soviet long-range 
missile capability, caused a defence crisis in the 
United States because of the perceived " missile 
gap ". The Gaither Committee, immediately estab-
lished to submit a study on defence and deter-
rence, advised: accelerate the production of inter-
continental and submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles; station intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
in Europe; disperse air-bases; improve warning 
systems; harden missile launch sites and construct 
fallout shelters capable of safeguarding the entire 
population of the United States should an attack 
occur. 
34. President Eisenhower and State Secretary 
Dulles agreed to some of the abovementioned 
recommendations but they rejected the recommen-
dation to build fallout shelters for the American 
population because it suggested a reversion to the 
" fortress America " concept, whereby the United 
States would" write off (its) friends in Europe". 
35. In the late 1950s, strategists and military in 
both the United States and the Soviet Union were 
advocating the development of a capacity of pre-
emptive attacks. This would require the build-up 
of large counter-force capabilities with an instant 
readiness to fire, which in itself could provide an 
incentive to pre-empt. 
36. It was thought that missiles, whether inter-
mediate or long-range, should not displace bom-
bers. Many advantages were attributed to bom-
bers: not only could they carry a greater and more 
differentiated payload, delivered with higher 
accuracy, they were also far more flexible and 
versatile. They could be put on alert and sent on a 
mission, signalling resolve, and still be recalled 
while on their way to the target, something which 
could not be done with missiles once the button 
had been pressed. On the other hand, it was admit-
ted that bombers could not achieve surprise and 
that they were vulnerable to air defences. 
37. With the building of a large arsenal of mis-
siles by both the United States and the Soviet 
Union, it was also realised that they caused pro-
found changes in the strategy of deterrence. 
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38. In the 1960s, the United States and the 
Soviet Union had reached a position where an 
attack by either side would have resulted in 
mutual destruction, a surprise attack no longer 
producing dividends since each country had the 
residual offensive power to break through the 
defences of the other and to destroy it, regardless 
of whether the other country did strike first. This 
state of mutual assured destruction was conside-
red reassuringly stable. 
39. Missiles, it was said, were not very good at 
fighting each other, being too well-hidden and 
protected to be caught on the ground and too fast 
to be caught in the air. They were supposed to 
create a state of stable deterrence, which would 
work through the primitive threat of irresistible 
harm to the enemy's social and economic struc-
ture rather than through the prospect of victory in 
combat. Retaliation would be measured, not to 
win, but to prove to the attacker that his losses are 
likely to be incredibly large. It was hoped that 
through acting in this way war would be stopped 
before both sides were irreparably destroyed. 
40. The strategy of massive retaliation, as it 
had developed during the 1950s, provoked ever 
more criticism when it became apparent that the 
only retaliation available to the United States was 
often so disproportionate to the immediate provo-
cation that its use risked unwanted escalation or 
too serious political costs. 
41. On coming to power, therefore, the Kennedy 
administration accorded top priority to decreasing 
reliance on nuclear weapons to deter limited 
aggression, or, as was stated in a State Department 
analysis in February 1961: "We attach the great-
est importance to raising the threshold beyond 
which the President might have to decide to initi-
ate the use of nuclear weapons. " 
42. In a crisis or conflict, the administration 
also wanted to preserve for as long as possible a 
wide range of options, so that when a choice had 
to be made, it could be tuned to the circumstances 
of the moment. It should be mentioned that at this 
juncture of reappraisal Western Europeans were 
most concerned about nuclear options. They were 
anxious about any sign of a waning United States 
commitment to use nuclear weapons in the 
defence of Europe. 
43. The first result of the reappraisal came in 
1962, when Defence Secretary, McNamara, 
announced that " principal military objectives in 
the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major 
attack on the alliance should be the destruction of 
the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian 
population". Such behaviour was meant to pro-
vide a possible opponent with a strong incentive 
to refrain from striking cities. McNamara thought 
that this could keep nuclear exchanges limited and 
controlled. 
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44. However, when it became clear that the 
Soviet Union interpreted the "no-cities " and 
" counter-force " option as the planning of a 
United States first-strike capability, while the Uni-
ted States Air Force ~sociated it with the capacity 
to fight and win a nuclear war, McNamara gra-
dually played down this initiative. 
45. Kennedy may seriously have considered a 
no-first-use declaration, believing that a build-up 
of conventional weapons might release NATO 
from dependence on nuclear weapons. In the end, 
this idea was given up because the allies did not 
want to place any restrictions on what they saw as 
their most effective military asset and because, in 
a possible conflict, the western position in Berlin 
could not be maintained with conventional forces. 
46. In 1964 McNamara introduced the expres-
sion " assured destruction " to emphasise the 
disastrous effects of a general nuclear war. The 
strategy of assured destruction was intended to 
deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United 
States or its allies by maintaining at all times a 
clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unac-
ceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor, or 
combination of aggressors, even after absorbing a 
surprise first strike. 
47. At the same time, McNamara was not 
bothered by the fact that the Soviet Union would 
also attain an assured destruction capability and 
he even refused to hinder this situation happen-
ing. He was aware that the consequence would 
be mutual assured destruction (MAD), a situa-
tion earlier designated as a stable balance of 
terror. 
48. Meanwhile, in the United States, there was 
growing irritation over the concept of mutual 
assured destruction, in particular since it was dis-
couraging the development of operational nuclear 
options which might be an alternative to an all-out 
nuclear attack. There was a growing tendency to 
make the United States deterrent more credible by 
making it possible to fight a nuclear war in a non-
suicidal manner. It was thought therefore that a 
greater capability had to be developed to use 
nuclear forces in a rational and less apocalyptic 
fashion. 
49. Responding to the new strategic thinking in 
the United States, and to strong criticism in Eur-
ope against the doctrine of massive retaliation 
which was no longer considered credible, NATO, 
at its December 1967 ministerial meeting, adop-
ted the strategy of flexible response which, accor-
ding to the official communique, was " based 
upon a flexible and balanced range of appropriate 
responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels 
of aggression or threats of aggression. These res-
ponses, subject to appropriate political control, 
are designed, first to deter aggression and thus 
preserve peace; but, should aggression unhappily 
occur, to maintain the security of the North Atlan-
tic Treaty area within the concept of forward 
defence." 
50. It should be noted, however, that the inten-
ded significant enlargement of NATO's conven-
tional capabilities which was an integral part of 
the concept of flexible response was never really 
implemented on a large scale, sufficient to make 
the concept effective. 
51. In 1974, the on-going search for alternative 
options resulted in the " Schlesinger doctrine ", 
the central objective of which was to have a very 
wide range of options for the hypothetical 
employment of central strategic forces with a bias 
on the development of smaller strikes which were 
to be counter-force rather than counter-city in 
character. The objective was to limit the chances 
of uncontrolled escalation and hit meaningful tar-
gets with a sufficient accuracy-yield combination 
to destroy only the intended target and to avoid 
widespread collateral damage. 
52. Stimulated by events in the Yom Kippur 
war of October 1973, there was a growing convic-
tion that new technologies for conventional wea-
pons could raise the nuclear threshold (diminish 
the threat of recourse to nuclear weapons). 
53. During the sixties, even in Europe, there 
had been growing doubts that the short-range so-
called tactical nuclear weapons, while forging a 
welcome direct link between the defence of Wes-
tern Europe and the United States nuclear forces, 
could be put to any good use in an actual conflict. 
Their yield was disproportionate in relation to 
their task and it was realised that their employ-
ment would lead to extensive collateral damage in 
the territory to be defended. 
54. Efforts to modernise these weapons and 
make them more usable, led to the acrimonious 
" neutron bomb " debate, which remained unresol-
ved (1976-77). Even during the debate on theatre 
nuclear forces, there was a determined will within 
the alliance to reduce the total number of nuclear 
warheads at its disposal to the lowest possible level 
still consistent with the maintenance of credible 
deterrence. At Montebello, NATO ministers deci-
ded to withdraw 1 400 warheads from the Euro-
pean theatre during the coming years, which would 
bring to 2 400 the total number of warheads remo-
ved from Europe since 1979. The Soviet focus on 
development of intermediate-range systems which 
could be employed against rear echelons and cities 
in the European theatre led to NATO'S December 
1979 decision to deploy 572 United States interme-
diate-range ballistic and cruise missiles on Euro-
pean soil. As an integral part of the modernisation 
decision, ministers also decided that 1 000 United 
States nuclear warheads were to be withdrawn 
from Europe as soon as possible. Even if Euro-
peans were aware that such European-based sys-
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terns, which could strategically threaten the 
Soviet Union, might weaken the link between 
European security and the United States strategic 
forces, they had asked for it themselves to make 
up for the growing NATO/Warsaw Pact asymme-
tries in this field. 
55. At the same time, however, it was decided 
to seek arms control negotiations with the Soviet 
Union involving theatre nuclear forces (TNF) in 
order to achieve a more stable overall nuclear 
balance at lower levels of armaments and to 
advance detente. 
56. After years of discussions and negotiations, 
the United States and the Soviet Union signed the 
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty in 
December 1987. This treaty involved the removal 
of 470 long-range INF missiles (SS-20s and SS-
4s) and 387 short-range INF missiles (SS-12-22s 
and SS-23s) deployed by the Soviet Union, as 
well as 429 United States Pershing lis and 
ground-launched cruise missiles. It was the first 
disarmament agreement ever to reduce, rather 
than just limit, nuclear weapons. 
57. The conclusion of the START I (20th July 
1991) and START 11 (January 1993) treaties is 
dealt with elsewhere in this report. 
58. At the NATO summit meeting in London in 
July 1990, it was concluded that "the alliance 
must maintain for the foreseeable future an appro-
priate mix of nuclear and conventional forces 
based in Europe". Negotiations on short-range 
nuclear forces were expected to start soon. 
59. It was also stated that the allies would reduce 
their reliance on nuclear weapons. Finally, it was 
said that nuclear weapons would " continue to ful-
fil an essential role in the overall strategy of the 
alliance to prevent war by ensuring that there are no 
circumstances in which nuclear retaliation in res-
ponse to military action might be discounted". It 
was added : " However, in the transformed Europe, 
they will be able to adopt a new NATO strategy 
making nuclear forces truly weapons of last resort". 
60. 'President Bush then took a number of uni-
lateral initiatives on nuclear arms reductions in 
September 1991, while asking the Soviet Union to 
act in the same way. He announced that the United 
States would withdraw all its nuclear artillery 
shells and all nuclear warheads for its short-range 
ballistic missiles to the United States. These and 
any similar warheads currently stored in the Uni-
ted States would be dismantled and destroyed. 
61. Furthermore, the United States would 
remove all tactical nuclear weapons, including 
nuclear cruise missiles, from its surface ships and 
attack submarines. It would also remove nuclear 
weapons associated with land-based naval air-
craft. Many of these weapons would be dismant-
led and destroyed with the remainder being placed 
in secure central storage areas. 
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62. All strategic bombers would be removed 
from day-to-day alert status and their weapons 
returned to storage areas. 
63. He also announced that development of the 
Peacekeeper ICBM rail garrison system and the 
mobile elements of the small ICBM programme 
had been terminated and that the small single 
warhead ICBM would be the sole remaining Uni-
ted States ICBM modernisation programme. 
64. The United States would immediately 
stand down from alert all United States ICBMs 
scheduled for deactivation under START. After 
ratification of START, it would accelerate their 
elimination. 
65. Significantly, the President also proposed 
discussions with the Soviet Union to explore co-
operation on nuclear command and control, 
warhead security and safety, and safe and envi-
ronmentally responsible storage, transportation, 
dismantling and destruction. 
66. It is quite clear from all this, and especially 
from the last proposals to the Soviet Union, that 
there had been a shift in United States thinking 
from deterrent strategies towards eliminating 
and controlling as many nuclear weapons as 
possible. 
67. Following these proposals, NATO minis-
ters, meeting in Taormina in October 1991, asses-
sed that there was no longer any requirement for 
nuclear ground-launched, short-range ballistic 
missiles and artillery. They stated that " In addi-
tion to the elimination of ground-launched 
nuclear systems, the number of air-delivered 
weapons in NATO's European stockpile will be 
greatly reduced. The total reduction in the current 
NATO stockpile of sub-strategic weapons in 
Europe will be roughly 80%. " 
68. Furthermore, it was said that " since 
conventional forces alone could not ensure war 
prevention they would continue to base effective 
and up-to-date sub-strategic nuclear forces in 
Europe, but these would consist solely of dual-
capable aircraft, with continued widespread parti-
cipation in nuclear roles and peacetime basing by 
allies. " Finally, almost out of an old habit, it was 
stressed that " sub-strategic nuclear forces com-
mitted to NATO continue to provide the neces-
sary political and military link to NATO's strate-
gic nuclear forces and an important demonstration 
of alliance solidarity. " 
69. At the following summit meeting in Rome 
in November 1991, the new strategic concept of 
NATO was adopted and again it was stressed as 
usual that " the supreme guarantee of the security 
of the allies is provided by the strategic nuclear 
forces of the alliance, particularly those of the 
United States. " Specific mention was made of 
"the independent nuclear forces of the United 
Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role 
12 
of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence 
and security of the allies ". 
70. Then it was stated that through many recent 
and radical changes in Europe's security situation 
"NATO's ability to defuse a crisis through diplo-
matic and other means or, should it be necessary, 
to mount a successful conventional defence 
would significantly improve ". 
71. After this, there followed a sentence which 
was agreed to only after some discussion, but 
which in the end was swallowed by all the Euro-
pean allies: " The circumstances in which any use 
of nuclear weapons might have to be contempla-
ted by them are therefore even more remote. " It 
had been a long road from massive retaliation to 
the new strategic concept. 
Ill. The decision-making process in NATO 
72. Since any use of nuclear weapons in the 
framework of NATO's defence arrangements 
might have serious consequences for all allies, 
many of its non-nuclear member states have atta-
ched great importance to obtaining influence over 
the decision-making process or being involved in 
control over the alliance's joint nuclear forces. 
73. Such wishes were met in different ways. 
- From the late 1950s, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey 
and the United Kingdom have owned 
nuclear-capable systems which in times 
of war could <Jeliver United States 
nuclear devices. It was stipulated, how-
ever, that both in peacetime and in war, 
the United States retained control of 
these nuclear weapons, including the 
veto power over their use. All other Uni-
ted States nuclear weapons, even if assi-
gned to NATO's SACEUR where their 
use could be requested by both the Uni-
ted States and its NATO allies, also 
remained under the United States deci-
sion-making authority. 
- In 1962, the " Athens guidelines " stated 
that the United States allies would be 
consulted before a decision to resort to 
the use of nuclear weapons " time and 
circumstances permitting ". 
- In 1967, the Nuclear Planning Group 
was established, in order to allow for 
advance consultation of the principles on 
which the use of nuclear weapons would 
be decided. 
- In the framework of semi-annual 
WINTEX/CIMEX exercises, crisis con-
2. France renounced these arrangements when it left 
NATO's integrated military structure in 1966. 
sultation procedures were rehearsed with 
participation of high level government 
officials and ministers. 
IV. The United States 
(a) United Stlltes nuclear forces 
74. The annual report of the Secretary of 
Defence submitted to the President and the 
Congress in January I994, provides the most 
recent official overall statement on the defence 
policy of the United States. 
7 5. The report states that improving relati?ns 
with Russia has made the threat of a massive 
nuclear attack on the United States less likely than 
it was in the past. It adds, however, that even 
under START 11, Russia will retain a sizable 
nuclear arsenal and that the future political situa-
tion in the country remains highly uncertain. The 
two basic requirements to guide planning for Uni-
ted States strategic nuclear forces are said to be: 
- the need to provide an effective deterrent 
while remaining within the limits of 
START I and II; 
- the need to allow for additional forces to 
be reconstituted in the event of a reversal 
of the currently positive trends. 
76. Pending the result of the current nuclear 
posture review and START 11 ratification and 
implementation, it is expected tJ:Iat by the ye.ar 
2003 the United States strategic arsenal will 
include at most: 
- I8 Trident submarines equipped with 
C-4 and D-5 missiles; 
- 500 Minuteman m missiles, each carry-
ing a single warhead; 
- 48 B-52 H bombers equipped with air-
launched cruise missiles (ALCM-Bs and 
advanced cruise missiles); 
- 20 B-2 stealth bombers carrying gravity 
bombs. 
77. With the entry into force of START I and 
II all Minuteman m missiles will be downloaded 
td a single warhead. Implementing START II, the 
Peacekeeper system will be retired by the y~ar 
2003 or earlier, with the option to transfer Its 
Mark 2I highly-safe warhead to the Minuteman 
m. With no new intercontinental ballistic missiles 
under development, the Department of Defence is 
exploring new ways of preserving key industrial 
technologies. 
78. The remaining seven pre-Ohio class 
nuclear powered ballistic missile sub:r~.arines 
(SSBNs) will be phased out of the strategic force 
in 1994-9,5. After I997, the I8 Ohio-class SSBNs 
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will then form the bulk of the United States 
nuclear deterrent for the indefinite future. A deci-
sion to retrofit the Ohio-class SSBNs, already 
commissioned and currently carrying the C-4 
missile, with the more modern C-5 missile will be 
made in I995. 
79. Presently, the United States long-range 
bomber force includes 84 B-IBs and 64 B-52Hs. 
The first B-2 stealth bomber was delivered in 
December 1993. It has been decided that the B-IB 
bomber will soon be reoriented to a purely 
conventional role. 
80. As regards the inventory of nuclear bomber 
weapons, it has been decided to retire the short-
range attack missile (SRAM-A), while ~e p~o­
curement objectives for the advanced cruise miS-
sile (ACM) have been scaled back from I 460 
to 460. Some ALCM-Bs have been converted 
to conventional cruise missiles while others, 
together with some gravity bombs, have been 
retired or placed in storage. 
8I. The Defence Secretary, William Perry, sta-
ted recently that the United States would maintain 
the nuclear triad (land-based, sea-launched and 
air-launched missiles) as long as elements from 
all three forces remained active. On the other 
hand, he saw no basis for expanding new funds to 
build new systems. The fact that there are no pro-
curement funds for land-based ICBMs would, in 
his view, eventually lead to their obsolescence 
and to a situation where the United States nuclear 
forces would consist only of sea-launched ballis-
tic missiles and bombers. 
82. At present, funds are available for the saf~ty­
related modernisation of the ICBMs, upgradmg 
them to make sure they are viable until the year 
2020. The Defence Secretary argued that the new 
generation of SLBMs would have an accuracy 
very close to those of ICBMs, which might add 
another reason for not maintaining the ICBMs. 
He added that the principal argument for main-
taining a strong bomber force was the dual purpose 
of bombers, which have both conventional and 
strategic capabilities. The principal determining 
factor on the size of the bomber force would be 
the extent to which they could be used to support 
conventional warfare purposes 3• 
(b) United Stlltes nuclear posture review 
83. In October I993, the Defence Secretary, 
Les Aspin, initiated a nuclear posture review, the 
first major overhaul of the United States nucl~ar 
doctrine and policy for more than a decade, which 
should lead to a presidential decision before the 
end of I994. At the same time, the National Secu-
rity Council under Presidential Review Directive 
3. Hearing of the House Appropriations Committee (Defence 
Subcommittee), 24th February 1994. 
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34, has started to prepare a decision on the total 
level of nuclear armaments that should be aimed 
at in a new round of arms negotiations with other 
nuclear powers. It will also examine the question 
whether nuclear material removed from retired 
weapons should be stored or destroyed. 
84. At present, nuclear weapons planning and 
operations of the United States are formally 
governed by National Security Decision Directive 
13, signed by President Reagan in 1981, while the 
nuclear arsenal has been reduced by more than 
half since that year. 
85. Work has been divided into six main areas 
of interest, each of which is being studied and dis-
cussed in a specific working group. 
- Working Group I- ROle of nuclear wea-
pons in United States security. This work-
ing group is dealing with fundamental 
questions such as the purpose of nuclear 
weapons, the strategy of deterrence and 
the closely-related targeting of objec-
tives, and also questions connected with 
possible no-first-use. Although Russia is 
still considered to be the main determi-
ning factor, pariah states will also be 
taken seriously into consideration. 
- Working Group 11- Force structure and 
infrastructure. Among other things, this 
working group is discussing the force 
sizing rationale, the need for maintaining 
the existing triad, the mix of strategic 
and theatre forces and the relationship 
between nuclear and conventional 
forces. Another important issue here is 
the conditions requiring a national mis-
sile defence. 
- Working Group Ill- Force operations, is 
going into the type and structure of res-
ponse options, operating practices and 
command and control requirements. It 
also investigates better control of hair 
trigger situations. 
- Working Group IV- Safety and Security, 
is concerned with, among other things, 
improvements to reduce the risk of acci-
dental or unauthorised use, physical 
security improvements and the potential 
for safety improvements after the 
coming into force of a comprehensive 
test ban treaty. Technology-sharing with 
other nations is also considered an 
important issue. 
- Working Group V - Alternative United 
States nuclear postures and counter-pro-
liferation policy, is discussing the pos-
sible further integration and implementa-
tion of the earlier counter-proliferation 
initiative in United States nuclear policy. 
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- Working Group VI - Alternative United 
States nuclear postures and threat reduc-
tion policy, is discussing present and 
future options for formal agreements, 
possible reciprocal unilateral steps and 
alternatives in case START I and START 
II are not fully implemented. It is also 
looking at the potential for mutual rein-
forcement between force posture and 
threat reduction policy towards the for-
mer Soviet Union. 
86. Officials involved in the nuclear posture 
review are well aware of possible consequences 
for the structure of NATO, which is one reason 
why, in that framework, high-level group meet-
ings have been planned to ensure allied input. 
They have also been eager to declare that commit-
ments towards the allies will not change and that 
any possible changes in United States nuclear 
posture will be evolutionary rather than revolu-
tionary. 
87. Department of Defence officials have 
emphasised that in the current discussions on the 
nuclear posture review, no suggestion has been 
made to eliminate the approximately 700 United 
States tactical bombs that remain deployed with 
United States and allied forces in Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and the Uni-
ted Kingdom. 
88. Although the issue of nuclear weapons 
attracts little attention in the present public political 
debate in the United States, a lively discussion is 
taking place among defence specialists. Critics of 
the present administration point out that in the 
nuclear posture review, the Clinton administration 
should in any case try to avoid implementing unila-
terally-declared cuts in United States nuclear forces 
more rapidly than the Russians, or than it is obliged 
to do according to its own treaty obligations. 
89. Second, doctrinal shifts should be avoided, 
since they could do irreversible damage to the cre-
dibility of United States forces. In this framework, 
a no-first-use declaration and abandonment of the 
extended deterrence would be very undesirable 
further stages which would result in making the 
United States commitment to security in Europe 
less credible. 
90. Third, decisions to make further cuts in 
essential elements of the nuclear forces and a fai-
lure to maintain the full nuclear infrastructure 
could easily lead to an irreversible erosion of the 
nuclear capability. A number of single warhead 
ICBMs based on United States territory should 
be maintained in any configuration of future 
United States nuclear forces. Not only are they 
less costly than SLBMs and highly accurate, but 
since they are potential targets for an adversary, 
they would enhance the credibility of extended 
deterrence. 
91. Apparently, no final conclusion can be 
drawn from the debate whether nuclear weapons 
have a deterrent role in regional conflicts where 
proliferant nations possessing nuclear weapons or 
other weapons of mass destruction are involved. 
92. Some strategists suggest that during the 
Gulf war, the presence in the Persian Gulf of air-
craft-carriers with nuclear weapons on board may 
well have deterred Iraq from using weapons of 
mass destruction. 
93. Others say that the possible threat of the use 
of nuclear weapons was not a significant factor in 
the course of the war due to the presence of an 
extremely real threat of the use of conventional 
precision weapons with sufficiently devastating 
effects, as events have shown. 
94. It has also been argued that the possession 
of an overwhelming arsenal of nuclear weapons 
by the superpowers is not enough to deter other 
smaller states from developing nuclear weapons 
or other weapons of mass destruction. 
95. Although many political strategists enume-
rate the many advantages for the United States of 
having a vast nuclear arsenal at its disposal, others 
suggest that the United States military, confronted 
with the necessity of making a choice in view of 
important budget cuts, would prefer to have 
conventional precision weapons rather than a 
large arsenal of nuclear weapons which could 
only be used, if at all, in extreme circumstances 
and certainly not in the more likely contingencies 
of the post -cold war world. 
(c) The counter-proliferation initiative 
96. The United States considers nuclear proli-
feration as one of the most urgent and direct 
threats to its own security and its interests abroad, 
a perception which was confirmed once again in 
the September 1993 bottom-up review of the 
Department of Defence. In the government's opi-
nion, the risks of proliferation have greatly 
increased with the break-up of the former Soviet 
Union. 
97. In the former Soviet Union, nuclear 
weapons were deployed on the territory of four 
different states which were going through a period 
of profound political and economic transition. 
Indeed, nuclear disarmament agreements have 
been concluded, but there is a risk that nuclear 
weapons, material or technology may find their 
way to a black market or that expertise in the field 
of nuclear weapons would come into the hands of 
would-be proliferators. It is also observed that any 
possible influence which the former Soviet Union 
has exercised over its former client states has 
diminished. 
98. Another important factor increasing 
non-proliferation risks is the large-scale diffusion 
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of modern technology through an increased 
volume of world trade. 
99. Considering that a policy of non-prolifera-
tion, where prevention is the leading objective, 
would not be enough, former Defence Secretary, 
Les Aspin, on 7th December 1993, presented a 
counter-proliferation initiative aimed at protec-
tion. 
100. With prevention on the one hand and pro-
tection on the other as the two fundamental goals, 
the initiative intends: 
- to strengthen the Department of Defence's 
contribution to the government's efforts 
to prevent the acquisition of weapons of 
mass destruction or reverse it diplomati-
cally where it has occurred. In particular, 
it contributes to these efforts through 
marshalling its technical, military and 
intelligence experience to improve 
such activities as arms control com-
pliance, export controls, inspection and 
monitoring; 
- to protect United States interests and 
forces and those of its allies from the 
effects of weapons of mass destruction in 
the hands of hostile forces through assu-
ring that equipment, doctrine and intelli-
gence are available to confront an oppo-
nent in possession of such mass destruc-
tion weapons. 
101. An essential element of this initiative is the 
procurement of new weapons systems and mili-
tary equipment. Among these are improved non-
nuclear penetrating munitions to destroy under-
ground installations, better systems to hunt 
mobile missile systems and the development of an 
improved theatre ballistic missile defence system 
without undermining the ABM Treaty. A military 
planning process is being developed for dealing 
with adversaries who have weapons of mass des-
truction. 
102. Efforts are being made to improve, in 
particular, the military counter-proliferation intel-
ligence in the development of nuclear and other 
weapons of mass destruction. 
(d) The United States nuclear posture-
can any conclusions be drawn for the future? 
103. The current debate in the United States on 
the role and utility of its nuclear weapons is rather 
confusing for any European trying to relate it to 
Europe's security. Many different proposals are 
being made, ranging from the suggestion to deve-
lop "smart", low-yield nuclear weapons which 
could be used in third-world contingencies, espe-
cially when the third-world possessors of 
weapons of mass destruction are involved in the 
proposal to eliminate nuclear weapons from the 
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United States arsenal because they will never be 
used anyway. 
104. Both political and military strategists are 
stressing the importance of nuclear weapons 
because of their deterrent role. On the other hand, 
it seems that the military are reluctant to attach 
too much importance to nuclear weapons because 
of their rapidly-diminishing role in the new inter-
national environment. 
105. For the time being, the United States will 
certainly retain a triad of nuclear weapons suffi-
cient to provide a secure retaliatory capability to 
deter the use of nuclear weapons by " hostile and 
irresponsible countries ". It is also true that after 
the implementation of START II at the beginning 
of the next century, the United States will still 
have a formidable arsenal of around 3 000 nuclear 
warheads. 
106. On the other hand, the paradoxical cha-
racter of nuclear weapons has increased. The sud-
den elevation of third world countries to the status 
of ruthless enemies on a par with the Soviet Union 
during the cold war is becoming a principal ratio-
nale for retaining a United States nuclear deter-
~ent. Former Defence Secretary, Les Aspin, 
mdeed argued that the only remaining nuclear 
threat to the United States, except for the loss of 
control over former Soviet nuclear assets, is a 
handful of nuclear-armed rogue states bent on 
aggression or terrorism. 
107. The concept of nuclear deterrence may be 
redefined to include its possible use against terro-
rist states or rogue leaders who threaten to use 
their own weapons of mass destruction but mili-
tary planners have also indicated that the chances 
are remote that the United States would use 
nuclear weapons in such circumstances 4• 
108. New nuclear threats may come from third-
world countries whose leaders are called irratio-
nal and therefore undeterrable, because they may 
not. follow the same logic as was applied by the 
Umted States and the Soviet Union in their 
nuclear deterrence relationship during the cold 
war. 
109. The main reason why third world country 
leaders are considered to be undeterrable may 
we~ be that the threat to use nuclear weapons in a 
reg10nal conflict has lost its credibility. 
110. There is no reason to have any doubts over 
the credibility of United States extended deter-
rence insofar as it concerns deterrence against the 
resurgence of a threat from Russia with renewed 
imperialist intentions. 
111. Over the years, the old adversaries had lear-
ned the rules of the nuclear weapons game. 
Nuclear deterrence has worked well in relations 
4. International Herald Tribune, 26th February 1993. 
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between West and East and there is no, or little, 
reaso~ to believe that the present or even a possi-
bly different future leadership in Russia will not 
act in accordance with the many tacit understan-
dings that have become part and parcel of the 
deterrence between the traditional nuclear powers 
which has been extremely effective. 
112. There is a feeling, however, that the United 
States is feeling increasingly uneasy with nuclear 
weapons and that in fact it would prefer to elimi-
nate them altogether. This would raise it to the 
level of the only superpower in the world with by 
far the largest effective conventional armed 
forces. The actual proliferation which might result 
in the acquisition of a limited number of nuclear 
we~pons by smaller regional states could put the 
Umted States in an awkward position. The proli-
ferant nation could indeed use its small or very 
small arsenal as a deterrence of the weak against 
the strong and considerably reduce United 
States possibilities of intervening in third world 
conflicts. 
113. Indeed, there are many signs that the Uni-
ted States is trying to diminish nuclear arsenals. It 
h~ recently concluded a number of spectacular 
bilateral nuclear weapons reduction treaties, 
announced a unilateral reduction initiative, and is 
als? pursuing a very ac_tive policy of non-prolife-
ration and counter-proliferation. 
114. It stopped producing special nuclear mate-
rials and new nuclear warheads in 1991 and 
announced an initiative for an international fissile 
material production cut-off for weapons use in 
1993. All major modernisation programmes for 
nuclear weapons except the Trident 11 SLBM 
have been cancelled and a comprehensive test ban 
treaty is being promoted. 
V. Russia 
115. During the cold war, the main form of the 
combat use of strategic nuclear forces in case of 
conflic_t was. ~e delivery of a retaliatory strike, 
launching missiles before enemy warheads hit the 
territory of the USSR. 
116. The option of a surprise attack was rejec-
ted. On the other hand, recent research in former 
East German archives has made it clear that there 
were plans for pre-emptive nuclear counterforce 
s~es in response to observation of NATO prepa-
rations for nuclear launches 5• The former Soviet 
Union had a nuclear war fighting doctrine and 
strategy and, as one official declared in 1988 
" while rejecting nuclear war and waging ~ 
struggle to avert it, [it] nonetheless proceeded 
5. Beatrice Heuser, Comparative Strategy volume 12 pages 
437-457. ' ' 
from the possibility of winning it 6 ". It should, 
however, be noted that great care was also taken 
not to proceed to a nuclearisation of the conflict 
unless the enemy was about to do so. 
117. In November 1993, Russia's new military 
doctrine was made public. Contrary to Soviet tra-
dition, it was not the product of a long-term deli-
beration by the state's political leadership in 
consultation with military experts from the armed 
forces. The new doctrine, even if it took account 
of policy requirements of various groups involved 
in Russian policy-making, was entirely produced 
within the Ministry of Defence by a team estab-
lished by Defence Minister Pavel Grachev. The 
(national) Security Council was told to approve it 
without discussion. On the other hand, western 
experts also consider the new doctrine as a key 
element in the Russian leadership's attempts to 
regain control of the armed forces and ensure the 
cohesion of the Russian Federation. 
118. A number of Russian analysts have pointed 
out that there is a lack of political control over the 
military since the collapse of the traditional insti-
tutions controlling the entire machinery of the 
Soviet state. They argue that in military affairs, 
the military are almost controlling politics. This is 
not reflected only in the ongoing battle over ratifi-
cation of START II, to be mentioned later in the 
present report, but also in the negotiations on the 
defence budget for 1994. In the budget for 1994, 
the Finance Ministry had proposed a sum of 
37 trillion roubles for defence. The military have 
now asked for 80 trillion roubles, but negotiations 
might result in an allocation of 53 trillion roubles 
to defence, causing either a drain on the budgets 
of other ministries or a huge extra state deficit. 
The armed forces have argued that, since defence 
spending started to decrease in 1989, savings on 
the defence budget were achieved entirely at the 
expense of the armed forces' combat-readiness. 
Because of fuel shortages, many routine combat 
training plans were scrapped, flight training pro-
grammes were curtailed, naval vessels had to 
remain in the docks or at anchor, equipment was 
not repaired, housing construction all but stopped 
and fuel reserves were not replenished, to give 
only a few examples. 
119. It is also argued that without an appropriate 
budget it will not be possible to carry out the 
Defence Minister's proposals to gradually trans-
form the existing Russian armed forces into smal-
ler, but also more effective, mobile and flexible 
forces without socio-political perturbations. It 
should be noted that the new doctrine avoids cold 
war rhetoric and does not rebuild confrontation 
with the West. 
6. W.T. Lee, US-USSR strategic arms control agreements: 
expectations are reality. Comparative Strategy, page 417, 
volume 12. 
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120. As regards the use of nuclear weapons, the 
document states that Russia: 
" will not use nuclear weapons against any 
state that is a signatory to the 1st July 1968 
treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and does not possess nuclear 
weapons, except in the following instances: 
(a) an armed attack against the Russian 
Federation, its territory, armed forces and 
other troops, or its allies, by such a state 
that is linked by an alliance agreement with 
a state that does possess nuclear weapons; 
(b) joint actions by such a state with an-
other state that possesses nuclear weapons 
that result in or support an invasion or 
armed attack on the Russian Federation, its 
territory, armed forces and other troops, or 
on its allies; " 
121. Western analysts have interpreted the ins-
tances mentioned under (a) and (b) as clear 
signals to Eastern and Central European states 
that they turn themselves into potential nuclear 
targets once they join NATO. 
122. In fact, the new doctrine, without stating it 
explicitly, has dropped the Soviet pledge of no-
first-use, made in June 1982. It should be noted, 
however, that in the West the earlier no-first-use 
declaration was regarded as more a propaganda 
gambit in the INF debate than an element of a cre-
dible policy. In that respect, the new doctrine is 
seen as a down-to-earth confirmation of earlier 
policy. Obviously, the absence of a no-first-use 
declaration does not necessarily imply that Russia 
is developing a first-strike or pre-emptive strike 
nuclear strategy. 
123. It should be emphasised, however, that in 
view of the considerable physical and psychologi-
cal deterioration of its conventional forces in 
recent years, Russia has come to consider its 
nuclear forces as the only viable and credible ele-
ment of its armed forces. In the near and maybe 
even more distant future, Russia's nuclear forces 
will therefore have to take on the entire burden of 
strategic deterrence, a policy which is indeed 
confirmed in the new military doctrine. 
124. Russian experts have pointed out that, 
even after implementation of the agreed START 
treaties, the United States strategic nuclear 
forces will be able to fulfil a whole range of 
combat operations, including an effective first-
strike, retaliatory strike and other specific res-
ponsive actions. They consider even Russia's 
new mobile land-based single warhead SS-25 
missiles to be extremely vulnerable to destruc-
tion by a potential adversary possessing state-of-
the-art satellite intelligence facilities and crea-
ting manoeuvrable warheads, whose trajectory 
can be corrected by commands from reconnais-
sance satellites. 
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125. Taking this into account, there can be little 
surprise that Russian military experts argue that 
the action concept of Russia's strategic nuclear 
forces should provide for many scenarios, be 
flexible and based on geostrategic reality rather 
than on scholastic deliberations. 
126. Another consequence of the abovemen-
tioned arguments, combined with growing nation-
alism, various right-wing sentiments and com-
plaints by the military on fmancial and technical 
problems in the implementation of START IT, is 
that the ratification of the START IT treaty in its 
present form is facing considerable resistance in 
the new Russian Parliament, as confirmed by 
recent hearings held by the Duma's defence com-
mittee. 
127. It should, on the other hand, be noted that, 
as regards disarmament and non-proliferation, the 
Russian Government has emphasised the follow-
ing main objectives of its policy: 
- implementation of all existing arms 
control and disarmament agreements; 
- conclusion of a comprehensive test ban 
treaty in the near future 7; 
- indefinite extension of the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty, while increasing the 
number of participants; 
- support for all efforts to increase the effi-
ciency of an international non-prolifera-
tion regime concerning weapons of mass 
destruction, ballistic missiles and dual-
use technology; 
- improving the framework of confidence-
building measures. 
128. Regarding its relations with Western Eur-
ope, Russia is aware of the important changes 
taking place in the framework of the WEU mem-
ber states' objective to develop this organisation 
as a vehicle of Europe's defence identity. 
129. There is a strong feeling in Russia that it 
should not be excluded from developments in 
Europe. Even if it is understood that at present it 
would not be realistic to create an associate part-
nership between Russia and WEU, the Russian 
Government argues that steps should be taken to 
establish a pragmatic relationship which should 
include systematic political consultations at 
ministerial level, regular contacts at the level of 
defence experts and co-operation in such fields as 
satellite monitoring. It is understood that this 
might require formal decisions by the WEU 
7. The new military doctrine is using a slightly different 
wording and speaks of the establishment of a dialogue bet-
ween states possessing nuclear weapons on the problems of 
nuclear testing, for the purpose of reducing them to a mini-
mum necessary to maintain nuclear security, but not permit-
ting the improvment of nuclear weapons, leading later to 
their complete prohibition. 
18 
Council, but such steps, it is emphasised, might 
help to take away or diminish a growing feeling of 
isolation in Russian society. Russia considers a 
good working relationship between Russia and 
the European Union/Western European Union to 
be extremely important for the maintenance of 
peace and security in Europe. 
Russia's nuclear forces 
130. Notwithstanding recent reductions in its 
nuclear forces, the Russian leadership, strongly 
supported by the military, is determined to main-
tain Russia as a nuclear superpower. In that 
framework, modernisation of the nuclear forces is 
being continued. A new underground command 
post is under construction in the Ural mountains. 
131. As regards ICBMs, new SS-18s and single 
warhead SS-25s are being deployed. A successor 
to the SS-25, now under development, is expected 
to be flight tested and deployed before the year 
2000. Under the START IT treaty terms, up to 90 
of the SS-25 missiles may be deployed in conver-
ted SS-18 silos. 
132. The production of SSBNs (nuclear-pow-
ered ballistic missile submarines) has been halted 
and it is believed that of a total of 27 only one to 
six are on patrol at any given time. Russia has 
started to modify its Typhoon Class submarines to 
carry the more accurate SS-N-20 follow-on 
SLBM. 
133. The future of the air force component of 
Russia's strategic nuclear forces is rather vague. 
A large number of heavy bombers was deployed 
on the territories of Ukraine and Kazakhstan 
which have claimed them as their property. As a 
result, Russia has only 27 heavy bombers capable 
of carrying cruise missiles, and 52 bombers armed 
with nuclear bombs. The relatively low cost-
effectiveness of heavy bombers, which is virtu-
ally unsustainable during an economic crisis, has 
contributed to Russia's present policy not to 
strengthen this component of the nuclear triad. 
134. Further production of strategic bombers -
Blackjack and Bear-H - has been halted after a 
January 1992 announcement by President Yeltsin 
in which he also announced that no further long-
range ALCMs would be produced. Later in 1992, 
President Yeltsin said that Russia would unilater-
ally halt the production of medium-sized bombers. 
135. On the other hand, for the time being, stra-
tegic bombers will remain part of the nuclear 
forces because of certain well-known advantages 
which contribute to the flexibility of such forces. 
As already noted elsewhere in the present report, 
they are armed with various nuclear weapons, can 
attack unplanned targets and return to base in case 
of changes in the situation or a false alarm. 
136. On 29th January 1992, President Yeltsin 
also announced that Russia would destroy all the 
nuclear warheads associated with tactical ground-
launched weapon systems and that it would not 
produce any new ones to replace them. In Febru-
ary 1993, it was announced that all tactical 
nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from ships 
and submarines. 
VI. The START treaties 
(a) START I 
137. The first START treaty (START I) 8 was 
signed in Moscow on 30th July 1991 by Presi-
dents Bush and Gorbachev after more than six 
years of negotiations. The treaty calls for reduc-
tions in nuclear force levels to 1 600 delivery 
vehicles (SNDVs) and 6 000 strategic nuclear 
warheads. The number of warheads would actually 
be closer to 7 000-9 000 per side owing to the spe-
cific nature of counting rules. START I counts 
launchers rather than the missiles themselves, nor 
does it call for the destruction of warheads or mis-
siles. It establishes significantly-reduced limits 
for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) 
and their associated launchers and warheads, for 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), 
their launchers and warheads and for heavy bom-
bers and their armaments, including long-range 
nuclear air-launched cruise missiles. 
138. Verification of the START I treaty depends 
on three basic elements: (i) National technical 
means of verification (NTM). Under the treaty, the 
parties undertake not to interfere with NTM and 
provide for co-operative measures to enhance 
NTM. Specific provisions require the transmis-
sion of telemetric information from each ballistic 
missile during flight test and ban any technique 
denying full access to telemetric information. 
(ii) Exchange of data on treaty-limited systems 
and related facilities. These exchanges include 
numbers, locations, technical data, site diagrams 
and photographs. (iii) On-site inspections. There 
are 12 different types of inspections. 
139. The break-up of the USSR at the end of 
1991 prevented ratification by the Supreme 
Soviet (which dissolved itself on 26th December 
1991). After some hesitation about how to treat 
the four newly-independent former Soviet repu-
blics which retained strategic nuclear weapons, 
the Foreign Ministers of the five countries now 
involved signed the Lisbon Protocol on 23rd May 
1992, which provided that Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Russia and Ukraine would become parties to 
START I and assume the responsibilities which 
8. Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the reduction and 
limitation of strategic offensive arms. 
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the former Soviet Union had taken in signing the 
START I treaty. Under the protocol and attached 
letters, all nuclear weapons would be withdrawn 
from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine by the end 
of the seven-year implementation period, and 
Russia would become the sole nuclear weapon 
state (NWS) on the territory of the former Soviet 
Union. The protocol required the four republics to 
allocate responsibility among themselves. 
140. The United States Senate consented to rati-
fication on 1st October 1992 pending completion 
of implementation arrangements among the four 
republics. Like Russia, the United States condi-
tioned its ratification of the START I treaty on the 
ratification of START I and nuclear non-prolifera-
tion treaties (NPT). 
141. Russia ratified the START I treaty on 4th 
November 1992 but delayed the exchange of ins-
truments of ratification until Belarus, Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan had joined the NPT and made arran-
gements for implementing the treaty. Russia suc-
ceeded to the position of the USSR in the NPT as 
aNWS. 
142. In Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine the 
situation regarding ratification and implementa-
tion of START I was more complicated. Each 
of these republics had its own specific reasons 
for hesitating to take the final step and ratify 
START I. 
( i) Kazakhstan 
143. Kazakhstan initially remained aloof but was 
the first republic to ratify START I as early as 2nd 
July 1992. NPT ratification was approved in a 238 
to 1 vote by the parliament of Kazakhstan on 13th 
December 1993 and instruments of accession 
were deposited with the United States in February 
1994. 
144. When the Soviet Union disintegrated, 
Kazakhstan inherited 370 nuclear bombs and 
1 040 warheads on 104 SS-18 ICBMs. According 
to the Lisbon protocol, these bombs and warheads 
were to be transferred to Russian territory and dis-
mantled, leaving a nuclear-free Kazakhstan pro-
tected by a Russian nuclear umbrella. Not surpri-
singly, Kazakhstan had two nagging concerns 
about this plan: first, it was concerned over its 
national security because it occupies a large terri-
tory, does not have a large population and is geo-
graphically situated between Russia and China, 
where the possibility of cataclysm cannot be com-
pletely ruled out; second, Kazakhstan needed sub-
stantial fmancial aid to complete its nuclear disar-
mament given the country's economic problems. 
145. In February 1993, President Nazarbayev 
listed, among others, the following conditions that 
could accelerate the process of nuclear disarma-
ment in his country: security guarantees; the pos-
sibility of recycling the ballistic missiles for com-
mercial launching; a share of the hard currency 
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given by the West to facilitate nuclear disarma-
ment in the former Soviet Union; ownership of 
the uranium and plutonium recovered from 
warheads taken from Kazakh soil. 
146. Under Kazakh law, the nuclear warheads 
and bombs which it inherited from the former 
Soviet Union are Kazakh property. It should be 
noted, however, that Kazakh leaders have never 
had control over these nuclear weapons. 
147. At present, Kazakhstan is behind schedule 
in transferring nuclear weapons to Russia. Asked 
why it was taking so long to move nuclear 
weapons out of Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev 
replied that dismantlement and destruction of the 
silo-based multiple-warhead missiles was a 
labour-intensive process which required compli-
cated technical decisions and considerable finan-
cial means not available in the republic at this 
time. 
148. However, President Nazarbayev is strongly 
oriented towards his country's integration into the 
world economy and into the " civilised " interna-
tional community. He is therefore unlikely to dis-
regard treaty obligations. 
149. On 13th December 1993, President Nazar-
bayev signed the umbrella and implementing 
agreements for United States aid to dismantle 
nuclear weapons on its territory. 
150. On 25th December 1993, Russia agreed to 
take responsibility for dismantling and removing 
nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan. The latter would 
receive a portion of the proceeds generated by the 
sale of nuclear weapons components removed 
from its territory. 
151. On 22nd January 1994, President Nazar-
bayev stated that Kazakhstan would seek com-
pensation for the nuclear weapons on its territory 
as part of a deal similar to the trilateral statement 
made by Russia, Ukraine and the United States on 
14th January 1994. 
152. After many requests for more money than 
had been offered and various threats to keep the 
nuclear weapons, President Nazarbayev finally 
deposited Kazakhstan's instruments of accession 
to the NPT with the United States, formally join-
ing the treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state 
(NNWS) during his visit to Washington in 
February 1994. At the same time, a number of co-
operation agreements were signed, including a 
memorandum of understanding on defence co-
operation. In addition, the United States promised 
to provide about $396 million in aid to Kazakhs-
tan including $85 million designated as Nunn-
Lugar assistance for dismantling nuclear weapons 
in Kazakhstan. In 1993, Kazakhstan actually had 
received $91 million in aid. Sources in Russia'.s 
Defence Ministry have stated that at the end of 
1993, Kazakhstan had deactivated 12 of the 104 
SS-18s on its soil. 
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153. On 28th March 1994, President Yeltsin and 
President Nazarbayev signed various agreements, 
one of which concerns the disposition of nuclear 
forces in Kazakhstan. According to Russia's Inde-
pendent Television, the agreement provides for 
Russia's assumption of jurisdiction over the 
nuclear forces in Kazakhstan, with all warheads to 
be removed within 14 months. Silos and missiles 
in Kazakhstan would be dismantled within three 
years. Complete details of the dismantling process 
have not been revealed, nor is there any informa-
tion on whether, or how, Kazakhstan might be 
compensated for the highly-enriched uranium in 
the warheads. 
(ii) Belarus 
154. Belarus ratified the START treaty on 4th 
February 1993 and joined the NPT on 22nd July 
1993. It intends to become a nuclear-free zone. 
Originally, Belarus stated its objective to remain 
neutral and stay out of the CIS security system. 
However, this proved not to be immediately pos-
sible. Belarus was not in a position to declare an 
independent security policy and it had no choice 
but to sign the CIS agreement on common security 
on 9th Apri11993. Article X, part 3, of this agree-
ment allows the terrritory of Belarus, with permis-
sion of its parliament, to be used as a site for other 
countries' military bases and installations. 
155. In January 1992, there were 81 single-
warhead SS-25s on the territory of Belarus. Of 
these, 27 were taken off alert in October 1992 and 
transferred to Russia in 1993. Meanwhile, the 
jurisdiction and control of all these weapons had 
been turned over to Russia. Their transfer to Rus-
sia and destruction was originally planned for 
1993 and 1994. 
156. Later, on 24th September 1993, the Bela-
russian and Russian Prime Ministers signed an 
agreement on the withdrawal schedule for Rus-
sian strategic nuclear forces, setting completion 
for the end of 1996. The Belarussian Supreme 
Soviet ratified this agreement on 25th November 
1993. The United States praised Belarus for its 
willingness to remove nuclear weapons from its 
soil. 
157. By the end of 1993, officials of the Bela-
russian Defence Ministry disclosed that Belarus 
had transferred 27 of the 81 SS-25s to Russia. 
Belarus has dismantled 9 of the remaining SS-25s 
deployed on its territory. Russia planned to rede-
ploy the single warhead ICBMs rather than dis-
mantle them. 
158. On 15th January 1994, President Clinton 
promised Belarus $50 million in additional aid, 
including $25 million in assistance for transfer-
ring nuclear weapons to Russia. 
159. According to the most recent reports, the 
approximately 54 remaining missiles in Belarus 
are to be removed by the end of 1994. 
( iii) Ukraine 
160. Ukraine's initial reaction after the break-up 
of the Soviet Union was essentially anti-nuclear. 
In 1990, the Rada, Ukraine's parliament, solemnly 
proclaimed its intention for Ukraine to become a 
permanently neutral state, taking no part in milita-
ry blocs and abiding by three non-nuclear prin-
ciples of not accepting, producing or acquiring 
nuclear weapons. The radical non-nuclear policy 
of the declaration can be explained by the circum-
stances in which it was conceived. It was hoped 
that radical denuclearisation would favourably 
impress the West and thus secure international 
recognition. Apart from that, the legacy of Cher-
nobyl was playing an important role and the non-
nuclear policy was conceived without military 
input. 
161. In conformity with the declaration and 
agreements made earlier with Russia, Ukraine 
began to transfer all its tactical nuclear weapons 
to Russia for destruction by May 1992. This left 
Ukraine in possession of only 176 ICBMs (130 
SS-19s and 46 SS-24s) with 1 240 warheads, and 
41 strategic bombers (Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 
Blackjacks) carrying 328 air-launched cruise mis-
siles. However, even before the transfer of tactical 
nuclear weapons was completed, Ukrainians 
began to debate the wisdom of abandoning their 
nuclear arsenal and Ukraine's Rada blocked 
moves to transfer the missiles to Russia for dis-
mantling. 
162. Ukraine delayed ratification of START I 
and accession to the NPT for several reasons: 
- fear of Russia and growing tensions bet-
ween the two countries. Ukraine was 
seeking security guarantees from Russia, 
the United States and the United King-
dom (as depositories of the NPT); 
- as a bargaining chip to obtain more eco-
nomic aid under the guise of meeting the 
costs of dismantling and eliminating the 
nuclear weapons based on its territory 
and to be guaranteed its share of the 
money raised by the sale of fissile mate-
rial recovered from nuclear warheads 
after dismantling; 
- a belief that the possession of nuclear 
weapons adds to security, provides a 
powerful deterrent and increases influ-
ence and prestige in the international field; 
- a belief that its continued possession of 
nuclear weapons was a means of streng-
thening its hand in the negotiation on the 
division of the Black Sea fleet between 
Ukraine and Russia and on potential bor-
der problems. 
163. On 3rd July 1993, the Rada proclaimed its 
ownership of all nuclear weapons on its territory. 
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However, it also declared its intention not to use 
or threaten to use them and its intention to become 
a non-nuclear weapon state. 
164. On 16th July 1993, Ukraine's Minister of 
Defence announced that 10 SS-19 ICBMs were 
being dismantled. 
165. On 4th September 1993, the Massandra 
nuclear weapons agreements were signed, arran-
ging for the removal of nuclear warheads from 
Ukraine. Russian officials indicated that 17 
months would be needed to dismantle and remove 
the warheads. Within one year after the removal, 
Ukraine would receive the uranium fuel or the 
profit from the sale of uranium. The Rada said, 
however, that the withdrawal schedule required 
further negotiation. 
166. On the other hand, in November 1993, the 
Rada did at last ratify START I but with so many 
conditions that progress on implementation was 
still blocked. 
167. In January 1994, a trilateral agreement was 
signed by the United States, Russia and Ukraine 
in Moscow, which provided Ukraine with com-
pensation for transferring all nuclear weapons on 
its territory to Russia. Ukraine agreed to disman-
tle all of the nuclear weapons on its territory " in 
accordance with the relevant agreements and 
during the seven-year period as provided by the 
START I treaty and within the context of the 
Rada's statement on the non-nuclear status of 
Ukraine". 
168. Ukraine would begin the process by remo-
ving the warheads from all 46 SS-24s within 10 
months. Russia would ensure the safety of the 
warheads in Ukraine and Ukraine would provide 
the " conditions for Russia to carry out these ope-
rations". 
169. The agreement did not establish a formal 
timetable for removing warheads to Russia (call-
ing for completion within " the shortest possible 
time "), but one official said Ukraine would 
become nuclear-weapon-free within three years. 
Ukraine had asked to omit the three-year time-
table from the statement to avoid antagonising the 
Rada, which had called for a slower pace. The 
accord also provided Ukraine with monitoring 
rights to verify that Russia actually dismantled the 
warheads. 
170. The Presidents recognised the importance 
of compensation to Ukraine for the value of the 
highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in nuclear 
warheads located on its territory. In return for the 
transfer of " at least 200 " warheads from SS-19s 
and SS-24s to Russia over the next 10 months and 
if Ukraine reached a safeguards agreement with 
the IAEA, it would receive 100 tons of nuclear 
fuel over the same time period. The uranium from 
warheads in Ukraine, valued by some officials at 
$1 billion, would be mostly returned to Ukraine in 
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the form of fuel rods. Ukraine would also receive 
a portion of the proceeds from Russian uranium 
sales to the United States. To fund the initial100-
ton transfer, the United States would advance $60 
million to Russia under the HEU sales contract 9• 
Compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons 
already withdrawn apparently remained an open 
issue. 
171. Russia and the United States also offered a 
series of security guarantees to Ukraine once 
START entered into force and Ukraine joined the 
NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. The two 
nations, joined by the United Kingdom, would: 
- respect Ukraine's borders in accordance 
with the principles of the CSCE final act; 
- refrain from threatening to use force; 
- seek United Nations Security Council 
action to assist Ukraine if it were 
attacked by, or threatened with, nuclear 
weapons; 
- not use or threaten to use nuclear 
weapons against Ukraine. 
172. Ukraine had sought broader guarantees but 
nonetheless saw it as " critical " to have a docu-
ment signed by both Russia and the United 
States. 
173. On 20th January, the Rada opened its 1994 
session and started to discuss the agreement. It 
appeared that many Ukrainian nationalists still 
wished to retain the newer SS-24s for self-
defence, especially after the ultra-nationalist vic-
tory in last December's parliamentary elections in 
Russia. However, there seems to be a consensus in 
Kiev that ageing SS-19s should be dismantled 
because they pose enormous dangers. 
174. On 3rd February 1994, the Rada dropped 
its conditions for ratifying START I by passing 
the resolution proposed by President Kravchuk, 
with the exception of NPT accession. 
175. Some issues remain ambiguous despite the 
passing of the resolution. Although President 
Kravchuk implied that Ukraine would eliminate 
all the nuclear weapons on its territory, it is 
unclear whether that is the intent of the Rada or 
whether it still views only a portion of the 
weapons as falling under START. 
176. On 8th-9th February 1994, Russia and 
Ukraine held the first round of talks on implemen-
ting the trilateral agreement. Two days later, Rus-
sia stopped supplying nuclear fuel to Ukraine to 
pressure it into acceding to the NPT. 
9. Russia and the Unite9 States signQd a 20-year, $ 11.9 bil-
lion contract for the United States to purchase 500 tons of 
uranium salvaged from former Soviet warheads. 500 tons 
represent about 20 000 nuclear warheads and a three-year 
supply of the world's nuclear fuel demand. 
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177. At the beginning of March 1994, President 
Leonid Kravchuk, in stating that " fulfilment of 
agreements, including agreements on nuclear 
commitments, is possible only if the economy 
works", again cast doubt on whether Ukraine 
would continue to honour its nuclear disarmament 
commitments. 
178. The President's statement came after Rus-
sia's Gazprom company, a state-owned mono-
poly, threatened to reduce supplies to Ukraine for 
the second time in a week. Ukraine is likely to 
remain dependent on Russia for energy supplies 
for many years to come because of the financial 
hurdles involved in building pipelines from other 
states. 
179. On 5th March 1994, the Clinton adminis-
tration announced it would double its financial aid 
to Ukraine to some $700 million a year: $350 mil-
lion in economic aid and $350 million to1~elp the 
weapons denuclearisation programme . How-
ever, the United States would urge the IMF to 
withhold $1 billion in loans for Ukraine unless it 
took more positive steps to privatise industry and 
curb inflation, currently running at a rate of 
approximately 90% a month. 
180. On 21st March 1994, the Defence Secre-
tary, William J. Perry, said the United States 
would add $100 million to its $135 million alloca-
tion to Ukraine's nuclear missile dismantlement 
programme. Mr. Perry signed aid agreements for 
dismantling nuclear missiles sited in Ukraine ($50 
million), the conversion of military industries to 
civilian production ($40 million) and tighter' secu-
rity in the shipment and storage of nuclear 
weapons in Ukraine ($10 million) 11 • 
181. The first session of the new Rada, elected 
in March 1994, was scheduled for 11th May. Its 
position on the START treaty's implementation 
remains to be seen. 
182. President Kravchuk stated on 14th May 
1994 that 180 nuclear warheads had been remo-
ved from Ukraine to Russia. He added that, as the 
process of disarmament is proceeding according 
to plan, by the end of May all United States mis-
siles aimed at Ukraine will be recoded and 
Ukraine will cease being targeted by American 
warheads. 
183. Several reports in the Russian and western 
press have provided information on the Ukrainian 
disarmament process. Colonel General Igor 
Sergeyev, the Commander of the Russian Strategic 
Rocket Forces, stated on 4th May 1994 that all SS-
10. It should be noted that the Nunn-Lugar amendment had 
earmarked $175 million in aid to Ukraine, $135 million for 
missile dismantlement and $40 million for the cr~tion of a 
research centre for nuclear scientists, forming a nuclear 
emergency response team. 
11. Financial Tmes, 22nd March 1994. 
24s in Ukraine had been deactivated and their 
warheads removed. He also noted that some 302 
launchers in Russia had been " liquidated " as called 
for under START I. Also on 4th May 1994, a Ukrai-
nian Defence Ministry spokesman said that there 
were only a few SS-24 missiles left to deactivate. 
Some 180 nuclear warheads have now been remo-
ved from Ukraine. 
* 
* * 
184. Fmally, it should be noted that the START I 
treaty has not yet legally entered into force as instru-
ments of ratification have not been exchanged. The 
parties are, however, implementing its provisions. 
(b) START/I 
185. On 3rd January 1993, President Bush and 
President Yeltsin signed the START II agreement, 
which is to be considered as a prolongation of the 
earlier START I. 
186. START II, if implemented, will eliminate 
the most destabilising strategic weapons, heavy 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all 
other multiple-warhead ICBMs, also called 
MIRVed (multiple re-entry vehicle) ICBMs. It 
will also reduce dramatically the total number of 
strategic nuclear weapons deployed by both coun-
tries. The treaty includes a protocol on elimina-
tion or conversion concerning heavy ICBMs and 
heavy ICBM silos, a protocol on exhibition and 
inspection concerning heavy bombers, and a 
memorandum on attribution. The reduction to the 
ceilings set will take place in two phases. 
187. By the end of the first phase, that is seven 
years after the entry into force of START I, each 
side must have reduced its total deployed strategic 
nuclear warheads to 3 800-4 250 warheads. Those 
include the number of warheads on deployed 
ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
(SLBMs) as well as the number of warheads for 
which heavy bombers with nuclear missions are 
equipped. Of this total, no more than 1 200 may 
be on deployed MIRVed ICBMs, no more than 
2 160 on deployed SLBMs, and no more than 650 
on deployed heavy ICBMs. 
188. On 1st January 2003, by the end of the final 
and second phase, each side must have reduced its 
total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 
3 000-3 500. Of those, none may be on MIRVed 
ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs.Thus all MIR-
Ved ICBMs must be eliminated from each side's 
deployed forces; only ICBMs carrying a single-
warhead will be allowed. No more than 1 700-
1 750 deployed warheads may be on SLBMs. 
There will be no prohibition on MIRVed SLBMs. 
189. According to START II, the Americans will 
have to dismantle about half of their Trident I and 
Trident 11 missiles with eight warheads. By the 
23 
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same date, most of the MIRVed missiles will be 
adapted to missiles with a single warhead. This 
last provision is one of the concessions made to 
the Russians who wish to transform 90 launching 
pads for their SS-18 missiles to house the SS-25. 
In exchange, the Russians have agreed to Ameri-
can inspections being carried out during the adap-
tation of SS-25 silos. Russia and the United States 
will be authorised to transform 105 of their mul-
tiple-head land missiles into single-headed mis-
siles. This also was a claim lodged by Russia 
which wanted to transform 105 of its 170 SS-19 
missiles, equipped with six warheads, into single-
headed missiles. As far as nuclear bombers are 
concerned, the number of warheads on each plane 
will be specified in a memorandum in annex to 
the treaty. The Americans made a concession to 
the Russians on this by accepting to give them 
information on the number of nuclear warheads 
transported by their bombers, including the new 
B-2 stealth bombers. 
VII. The United Kingdom 
(a) The United Kingdom's nuclear forces 
190. When the United Kingdom established its 
nuclear forces in the 1950s, one of the main rea-
sons was to deter aggressive action by the Soviet 
Union, partly compensating for the relative weak-
ness of the nation's conventional forces as com-
pared to those of the Warsaw Pact. 
191. From the beginning, British nuclear forces 
were meant to be part of a collective allied effort 
and, since the Nassau agreement of December 
1962, have been committed to NATO 12• They 
were also intended to operate as a second centre 
of decision-making within the alliance in case a 
potential adversary would think that the United 
States would hold back 13 • It was thought that a 
United Kingdom decision to use nuclear weapons 
could trigger a United States nuclear response, an 
arrangement thought to be the more effective 
because of the presence of United States military 
facilities on United Kingdom territory. 
192. The United Kingdom has always main-
tained a twofold nuclear doctrine according to which 
its nuclear forces were on the one hand part of 
NATO's spectrum of deterrence, operating under the 
single integrated operational plan (SlOP), while able 
on the other to provide massive retaliation against 
any aggressor attacking the nation. 
12. In the Nassau statement of 21st December 1962, it was 
said that:" ... except where Her Majesty's Government may 
decide that supreme national interests are at stake, these Bri-
tish forces will be used for the purposes of international 
defence of the western alliance in all circumstances. " 
13. The future United Kingdom strategic nuclear deterrent 
force (DOGD 80/23, July 1980). 
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193. Within the framework of both NATO and 
WEU, the United Kingdom has always conside-
red its nuclear forces as being fully committed to 
the defence of the territory of its allies. This has 
been confirmed recently by the United Kingdom 
Secretary of State for Defence, Malcolm Rifkind, 
when he said that " Britain would regard her own 
vital interests as at stake in any attack upon an 
alliance member. " 14 
194. The United Kingdom's position as regards 
the role and future of its nuclear weapons was 
recently made clear in a major address in London 
by the Defence Secretary Malcolm Rifkind on 
16th November 1993. 
195. Mr. Rifkind stated that although complete 
and general nuclear disarmament remained a desi-
rable ultimate goal, it would be neither practical 
nor realistic to give up nuclear weapons in the 
present circumstances, where the potential still 
exists for serious risk to British and allied inter-
ests. 
196. At present, there is a broad consensus 
among the main political actors of both govern-
ment and opposition for retaining nuclear wea-
pons in their role of minimum deterrent, under-
stood as " posing a threat of unacceptable damage 
to any aggressor". Officially, this deterrent is not 
directed at any country in particular, but the exis-
tence of Russia as a pre-eminent military power 
and nuclear superpower in Europe continues to be 
a determining factor in decisions on the United 
Kingdom's future force structures and postures. 
Nevertheless, it is recognised that Russia must be 
included as part of the solution to Europe's secu-
rity. It is stressed that the value of nuclear 
weapons does not lie in classical concepts of war-
fighting or war-winning, or even in mere deter-
rence of the use of nuclear weapons by an adver-
sary, but in actually preventing war. The United 
Kingdom is not in favour of a no-first-use decla-
ration, because this might imply that conventional 
war is a safe option. 
197. The United Kingdom will continue to build 
on its new relationship with its partners in the North 
Atlantic Co-operation Council through bilateral 
and multilateral efforts in co-operative threat reduc-
tion and attaches great importance to the prompt 
and full implementation of the START process. 
198. Meanwhile, it considers the American 
nuclear guarantee of fundamental importance to 
the collective security of the alliance. 
199. the British attitude towards nuclear co-
operation with France will be dealt with in a sepa-
rate chapter. 
200. In general, the· United Kingdom does not 
regard its nuclear weapons as playing an impor-
14. Address in Paris, 30th September 1992. 
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tant role in deterring proliferation. One of the rea-
sons is that the motivation for a country wanting 
to acquire nuclear weapons is likely to be regional 
and such decisions will most probably not be 
affected by the United Kingdom's possession of 
nuclear weapons. It is also noted that it is ques-
tionable whether an intended deterrent will work 
in the absence of an established nuclear deterrent 
relationship. 
201. The United Kingdom Defence Minister sta-
ted his thorough opposition to the development of 
more " usable " low-yield " smart " nuclear 
weapons, which according to some would allow 
nuclear deterrence to be effective in circum-
stances where existing weapons would be self-
deterring. Indeed, this would run counter to the 
British opinion that nuclear weapons cannot be 
used to fight a war. 
(b) The United Kingdom's nuclear force structure 
and weapons programmes 
202. Of the United Kingdom's four Polaris bal-
listic missile submarines, the first, HMS Revenge, 
was decommissioned in May 1992 as part of a 
programme to replace them by Trident subma-
rines around the year 2000. 
203. The first Trident SSBN, HMS Vanguard, is 
due to become fully operational by early 1995 at 
the latest. Each vessel can carry 16 Trident D-5 
SLBMs with a range of 12 000 kilometres and an 
accuracy to within 100 metres of the target. The 
eight warheads on each missile can be indepen-
dently targeted. The present Polaris missiles have 
a range of 4 630 kilometres, 900-metre accuracy 
and the three warheads are directed at the same 
target. 
204. The United Kingdom Government recently 
stated that it would not deploy more than 96 Tri-
dent D-5 missile warheads, and possibly signifi-
cantly fewer, instead of the 128 warheads on each 
of the four Vanguard class SSBNs, as announced 
earlier, when the latter came into service 15• It 
should be noted here that under the START 11 
Treaty, United States Trident 11 missiles can carry 
only four warheads each and that the United 
Kingdom will certainly be under international 
political pressure to follow suit. 
205. It is reported that a total of 67 Trident D-5 
missiles are to be bought from the United States. 
206. Given the government's announcement 
cancelling its participation in a British-French 
development programme for a tactical air-to-sur-
face missile to replace the WE-177 free-fall 
nuclear bombs by the year 2005, Trident will now 
also be used in a sub-strategic role, eventually 
becoming the United Kingdom's only nuclear 
system. 
15. Jane's Defence Weekly, 27th November 1993. 
207. Once the four Trident SSBNs are in service, 
the explosive power of the United Kingdom's 
operational nuclear inventory will have fallen by 
over 25% as compared with the 1990 figure. 
208. As a result of important reductions in the 
number of tactical bomber squadrons in both the 
Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, the number 
of WE-177 AIB gravity bombs will be reduced by 
over a half by the end of 1994. Meanwhile, all the 
WE-177 C nuclear strike/depth bombs carried by 
Royal Navy helicopters and aircraft have been 
taken out of service and destroyed. 
209. Altogether, the United Kingdom has now 
phased out most of its tactical nuclear weapons: 
namely the Lance surface-to-surface missile, 
nuclear artillery shells and nuclear depth charges. 
210. On 15th February 1994, the United King-
dom and Russia signed an agreement to detarget 
nuclear missiles directed at their respective coun-
tries as part of a larger framework of confidence-
building measures. 
211. The United Kingdom Government has 
launched a national programme of studies to 
assess the technical options, costs and perform-
ance of ballistic missile defence systems (BMD) 
that are available. It will decide on the basis of the 
£3 million study, to be presented to ministers in 
late 1996, whether the United Kingdom needs a 
BMD capability . 
212. A contract for developing and manufac-
turing BMD weapons systems would run to seve-
ral billions of pounds and, in the light of the seve-
re cutbacks now being made in all services, it is 
doubtful whether the armed forces could afford 
such a system if priorities need to be established. 
213. It should be noted that in 1989, the United 
Kingdom Government scrapped the surface-to-air 
Bloodhound missile without replacing it 16• 
VIII. France 
(a) Nuclear doctrine 
214. Until the end of the cold war and, more spe-
cifically, before the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
France's nuclear doctrine was designed mainly on 
the assumption of the existence of a Soviet threat. 
Even today, it can be assumed that the continued 
presence of a formidable nuclear arsenal in Russia 
and in certain other republics of the former Soviet 
Union, still constitutes an important rationale for 
maintaining French nuclear deterrence, even 
though the government has always been very 
reluctant to admit this objective publicly. 
215. Indeed, France has professed rather that it 
has no specific enemies and claims that its nuclear 
16. Financial Times, 16th February 1994. 
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deterrent is not directed against anyone in particu-
lar. Its recent revival of the phrase " tous azi-
muts " (all-round defence) indicates that its 
nuclear deterrence is directed against any power 
which might attempt coercion or aggression 
against France. 
216. Other reasons for France's maintaining its 
nuclear arsenal are the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons technology and the fact that such tech-
nology, having once been invented, is likely to 
remain an important tool in power politics. 
217. Even though France has both tactical and 
strategic nuclear weapons, it has never really had a 
strategy that included the possibility of fighting a 
war with nuclear weapons. What is now termed a 
pre-strategic use of nuclear weapons is meant to be 
the " final warning " before France decides on 
full-scale nuclear retaliation against an aggressor. 
218. France's strategy has always been to main-
tain a credible deterrence to prevent war, not win 
it. If a limited " final warning " did not succeed in 
halting the aggressor, the logical next step could 
only be full-scale nuclear retaliation. In principle, 
a second warning would be impossible since such 
behaviour would cast doubt on the credibility of 
nuclear deterrence as an effective means of pre-
ve~ting aggression. 
219. It is also understood that France's nuclear 
weapons will play a role only in the defence of 
national territory in Europe. 
220. As recently as February 1991, during the 
Gulf war, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs 
declared " . . . nuclear weapons cannot be battle-
field weapons and cannot be used except as the 
ultimate recourse when the national territory is 
threatened ". 
221. It should be noted that France's nuclear 
forces are not assigned to NATO. In 1986, France 
committed itself, under certain conditions, to 
informing the Germans in advance in the event of 
nuclear weapons being used against German terri-
tory, with qualifications resembling those in the 
1962 Athens guidelines. Successive French 
governments, however, have always claimed that 
they cannot define their vital interests with any 
precision in relation to the area they would 
defend, if necessary, with nuclear weapons. 
222. The most recent statement on the official 
French nuclear doctrine was made in the white 
paper on defence, which the government pub-
lished on 23rd February 1994. 
223. Confirming the main objective of France's 
nuclear forces, this states: 
"The French nuclear concept will continue 
to be defined by the will and capability to 
make any aggressor - irrespective of who 
such aggressors may be or their capabili-
ties -fear unacceptable damage, out of all 
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proportion to the advantage to be gained 
from conflict, if they seek to attack 
France's vital interests. In this day and 
age, nuclear weapons alone have this 
kind of capability, owing to their unas-
sailable power of destruction. For this 
reason they also have the advantage of 
preventing generalised warfare ... " 
224. The nuclear deterrent is meant to protect 
the country's vital interests, but these have not 
been defined very specifically, leaving the highest 
authorities of the state a certain freedom of action. 
225. It is also necessary to have the" capability 
to define the extent of such vital interests in 
various situations, at the required moment, and 
issue an unequivocal reminder of our determina-
tion: such is the function of the final warning ... a 
limited strike on military targets. " 
226. It should be noted, however, that with the 
changes that are taking place in international rela-
tions, a number of French strategists are considering 
the possible need to " develop more flexible 
weapons systems that promote deterrence more 
through the precision with which they strike than 
through the threat of a general nuclear exchange " 17• 
227. While the French" anti-cities" concept has 
not been discarded, strategists in France are increa-
singly interested in the options offered by greater 
flexibility, precision and controlled effects. These 
latter capabilities might prove more relevant in 
future contingencies which are likely to be diffe-
rent from massive East-West confrontation. 
228. There are those in France who recommend 
that the country should give up its old policy of 
deterrence of the strong by the weak which is 
based on making one's territory inviolable, and 
the principle of non-use of nuclear force. 
229. Arguing that nuclear weapons will continue 
to play a role in the world, they maintain that 
France should develop a dual deterrence. It should 
keep its capacity for massive retaliation, but, 
taking account of the risks of proliferation, it 
should develop an anti-site deterrence consisting 
of smaller " smart " nuclear weapons, enabling it 
to inflict a decisive - and as necessary nuclear -
strike on enemy strategic centres. 
230. However, the debate has only just started 
and no decisions have yet been made translating 
these new ideas into a new doctrine, new capabi-
lities and new operational concepts. 
231. In a major address on 5th May 1994, Presi-
dent Mitterrand unequivocally stated his position 
on the subject, and this is official policy: 
" I have firmly resisted the confusion over 
pre-strategic or tactical weapons. If there 
were to be a succession of nuclear warnings 
17. Pierre Joxe, Le Figaro, 19th May 1992. 
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we would be reverting to the concept of a 
graduated response. The warning is final; 
there are no more stages - the next is war ... 
I shall oppose the new risks of drift - for 
example when I hear talk of the use of ato-
mic power against the weak or the insane to 
settle problems outside our national terri-
tory or vital interests. Do we have to rally to 
the term surgical strike - decapitation is 
also used - which might go as far as the 
nuclear gun? " 
232. It is not to be expected that any changes in 
France's policy regarding its nuclear forces wil1 
be made before the next presidential elections in 
1995. 
(b) French nuclear forces 
233. France had developed and produced 30 
Hades ground-launched missiles with a maximum 
range of 500 kilometres when this programme 
was suspended in the summer of 1991 and then 
abandoned in 1992. These thirty missiles have 
now been stored, but this part of France's nuclear 
force can " be made operational within time-
limits commensurate with developments in the 
international situation ". Meanwhile, the nuclear 
warheads are held by the airforce. 
234. There are 45 Mirage 2000 N aircraft, each 
equipped with an air-to-ground medium-range 
missile with a range of 100 to 300 kilometres. The 
nuclear AN 52 munition for a total of 75 Mirage 
m and Jaguar aircraft was withdrawn from opera-
tional service in 1991 and dismantled in the 
framework of a unilateral nuclear disarmament 
policy. 
235. Meanwhile, 15 Mirage IV P aircraft, equip-
ped with the air-to-ground medium-range missile 
(ASMP), will remain in service until 1996. The 
new Rafale aircraft should take over their task at 
the end of the century. The replacement of the 
ASMP by a long-range air-to-ground missile 
(ASLP) is at present not considered urgent 18• 
236. The present 18 S-3D ballistic missiles at the 
plateau d' Albion could be obsolete by the begin-
ning of the next century, when they would very 
likely no longer be capable of frustrating an attack 
from an enemy anti-ballistic missile defence system. 
237. If France wishes to maintain an effective 
system of land-based ballistic missiles, it will 
have to take decisions on developing a successor 
to the S-3D missile within the next two years at 
the latest. 
238. In January 1994, President Mitterrand sug-
gested that the MS-5 (a multiple warhead missile 
with a range of 8 000 kilometres), now being 
developed to equip the new submarines by 2005, 
18. Le Monde, 7th May 1994. 
could also be installed at the plateau d' Albion 19• 
A decision to begin developing these missiles was 
taken in 1992, but this programme, at a total cost 
of 40 billion francs for 3 batches of 16 missiles, 
was slowed down by the present government at 
the beginning of 1994. 
239. Finalising the programme law 1995-2000 
for defence procurement, the French National 
Defence Council decided on 6th April 1994 that 
the entry into service of the M-5 missile should be 
delayed from 2005 to 2010. At the same time, a 
study has been commissioned to examine how the 
interim 6000 kilometre-range M-45 missile, now 
scheduled to be fitted to the new nuclear subma-
rines in 1996-1997, can be deployed in the silos of 
the plateau d' Albion 20• 
240. It is thought that these decisions will reduce 
the need for nuclear testing as the warhead for the 
M-45 missile has already been tested. Further 
tests may be required for development of the TN-
100 warhead, originally envisaged for the M-5 
missile, but it has been suggested that the present 
TN-75 warhead could be used for these new mis-
siles without additional testing 21 • 
241. When the government was criticised 
recently by Jacques Chirac for its "no nuclear 
tests " policy, the Defence Minister, Franrrois Leo-
tard, replied that the suspension of nuclear testing 
did not affect the efficiency of the strike force. It 
was also stated that the decision had been taken 
after " in-depth study and in agreement with the 
Chiefs of Defence staff " 22• 
242. Recently, however, the public debate in 
France on nuclear testing has intensified. On 5th 
May 1994, President Mitterrand again clearly 
confirmed his position regarding nuclear testing, 
making the following statement: 
" There will be no further tests before May 
1995. I have taken this decision and this 
situation will remain as long as I continue in 
office. There will be none under my succes-
sor either - unless the other powers resume 
testing- as France has no wish to offend the 
whole world by triggering nuclear escala-
tion and nuclear war and treating all poor 
countries with contempt. " 23 
243. The President also recalled that in the pro-
gramme law for the years 1995-2000, 10 billion 
francs have been allocated to a nuclear test simu-
lation programme. 
244. The day before, Defence Minister Franrrois 
Leotard stated that " the modernisation and minia-
turisation of nuclear weapons make it absolutely 
19. Le Monde, 11th January 1994. 
20. Financial Times, 8th Apri11994. 
21. Le Monde, 25th February 1994. 
22. Le Monde, 24th February 1994. 
23. Le Monde, 7th May 1994. 
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necessary to continue testing" adding that " France 
should carry out a minimum of tests before rati-
fying the test ban treaty" 24• 
245. It should be recalled that, on 15th October 
1993, the Committee on Defence and Armed 
Forces of the French National Assembly pub-
lished an information report on the simulation of 
nuclear testing which concluded that " all the 
information collected and compiled ... demon-
strates conclusively that France should be able to 
carry out nuclear tests " and that " without further 
nuclear tests France cannot be sure it is capable of 
acquiring a simulation system that guarantees it 
full control over its weaponry, thus assuring the 
country's security and independence". 
246. The new programme law has clearly discar-
ded the development of smart nuclear weapons 
for the time being, and the question remains whe-
ther France will be able to maintain its three sepa-
rate nuclear systems - ground-based, sea-based 
and air-launched- in the longer term. 
IX. Nuclear weapons co-operation in Europe; 
towards European nuclear deterrence? 
247. Even if it does not sound attractive to many 
in Europe and the United States, the credibility of 
the United States strategy of extended deterrence 
is subject to erosion. Certainly, at present no 
American government is prepared to say or even 
imply that it will withdraw the remaining tactical 
nuclear warheads from European territory. The 
withdrawal of all battlefield theatre nuclear wea-
pons because they had indeed become less appro-
priate in the new NATO strategy, militarily unne-
cessary and politically unacceptable was a first 
step, agreed upon wholeheartedly by all allies. 
But what will happen in the long term to the 700 
B-61 tactical nuclear gravity bombs, that remain 
on European soil after the 50% reduction decided 
by NATO in October 1991? 
248. The new NATO policy of nuclear weapons 
of last resort, with the even more remote chance 
of their being used, does not fit very well with 
the European concept of real deterrence to all 
types of war. It tends to imply a preference on 
the part of the United States for doing away with 
nuclear weapons with which neither politicians 
nor the military feel comfortable because they 
cannot be used easily and are a disadvantage to 
the strong in a world where proliferation is on 
the increase. 
249. It goes without saying that, given the Maas-
tricht Treaty's declared intention of developing a 
common European foreign and security policy 
and European defence identity, the role of 
France's and the United Kingdom's nuclear wea-
24. Le Figaro. 7th May 1994. 
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pons in this framework cannot be ignored. Sooner 
or later this issue will have to be considered 
thoroughly. 
250. There have been modest efforts in the past 
to discuss different possibilities for co-operation 
or consultation with European allies. French offi-
cials have made various suggestions which should 
be mentioned here. 
251. In July 1990, the then French Defence 
Minister, Jean-Pierre Chevenement, suggested 
that a Western European defence partnership offe-
ring Germany nuclear protection was the only 
possible choice, given that United States protec-
tion might become less certain, and Germany's 
developing its own nuclear deterrent would not be 
an attractive option 25 • In January 1992, President 
Mitterrand raised the question of whether it might 
be possible to develop a " European doctrine " 
within the European Community for the French 
and British nuclear forces. He argued that this 
would " very rapidly become one of the major 
questions in the construction of a joint European 
defence" 26• 
252. In September 1992, the then French Defence 
Minister, Pierre J oxe, was more forthcoming on 
the conditions of such co-operation when he sta-
ted: " Agreement among Europeans on a single 
doctrine, and the establishment of an appropriate 
political structure, seem to me to be essential pre-
conditions for the development of a European 
nuclear deterrent. However, we can already envi-
sage multilateral consultation on conditions for 
the implementation of nuclear weapons and a 
broadening of the nuclear guarantee. There is a 
need for dialogue among Europeans on this sub-ject. "27 
253. The British Defence Minister has also sta-
ted that he sees great benefit in closer co-opera-
tion and cohesion in nuclear matters between the 
United Kingdom and France, albeit "within the 
overall framework of the alliance " 28• 
254. Obviously, in the initial stage, there is a 
need for co-operation between France and the 
United Kingdom and steps have been taken in this 
direction. 
255. On 26th July 1993, France and the United 
Kingdom decided that the Anglo-French Joint 
Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine 
which had been established on a provisional basis 
in autumn 1992 should acquire a permanent sta-
tus. The commission, which brings together 
senior officials from the British and French 
Foreign and Defence Ministries, has now underta-
25. Le Monde, 13th July 1990. 
26. President Mitterrand, speech on lOth January 1992. 
27. Pierre Joxe, 29th September 1992. 
28. Address by the Defence Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, 
autumn 1993. 
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ken a comparison of the approaches of the two 
countries to the role of deterrence, nuclear doc-
trines and concepts, anti-missile defences, arms 
control and non-proliferation. Measures to improve 
safety and security are also being discussed but 
clearly practical co-operation, such as co-ordina-
tion of SSBN patrols and the avoidance of dupli-
cation in targeting, is ruled out for the time being. 
256. United Kingdom officials have stressed 
that there are almost no differences between 
France and the United Kingdom on fundamental 
nuclear issues, the only important one being that, 
according to the British, there is a follow-on use 
after sub-strategic employment of nuclear 
weapons, while the French do not allow for a 
fol~ow-on use between sub-strategic employment, 
which they understand to be the final warning and 
the holocaust. Both countries, however, consider 
their nuclear weapons an insurance policy against 
any possible threat to their vital interests, i.e. the 
security of Europe. In developing the Franco-
British dialogue and co-operation, the United 
Kingdom does not explicitly attempt to create an 
alternative to the existing transatlantic relation-
ship. It aims rather to strengthen the specific 
E:uropean con~bution t~ the deterrence underpin-
rung the collective secunty of the whole alliance. 
257. According to the British Defence Minister 
" it is very difficult today to identify any area 
where (the United Kingdom and France) are likely 
to have a fundamental difference of national secu-
rity interest as members of the European Union ". 
However, he also added that " it is equally diffi-
cult to conceive within the Atlantic Alliance of a 
substantial threat to one country which would not 
also be a threat to the other " 29• 
258. It should be noted nevertheless, that in 
October 1993 the United Kingdom withdrew its 
participation in the development of a common air-
to-surface long-range missile. This can hardly be 
interprete~ as a positive sign in terms of practical 
co-operatiOn. 
259. The French defence white paper of Febru-
ary 1994 rightly stated that the problem of a Euro-
pean nuclear doctrine would become one of the 
major questions in developing a common Euro-
pean defence. The issue would become the more 
~ge~t as the E~o~ean Unic_m created its political 
Identity alongside 1ts seaunty and defence iden-
tity. The dialogue with the United Kingdom would 
need to be continued and deepened, but this would 
not exclude exchanges with other partners. 
260. However, there would not be a European 
nuclear doctrine unless there were vital European 
interests, considered as such by Europeans and 
understood as such by others. 
29. Address by the Defence Secretary, Malcolm Rikfind, 
autumn 1993. 
261. France, which is not a member of NATO's 
Nuclear Planning Group, has never been forth-
coming in sharing information with its non-
nuclear allies. 
262. It should also be noted that President Mit-
terrand's 1986 declaration of intent on consulta-
tion with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic 
of Germany before any French use of nuclear 
weapons on German soil has never led to a Franco-
German understanding on the basis of operational 
and strategic principles. Nevertheless, it is a major 
concern of France's foreign policy to ensure that 
reunified Germany is solidly anchored in a Euro-
pean Union with a European defence identity as a 
rational component. In this framework, Germany 
must be provided with a credible nuclear deter-
rent, on the one hand to protect it from any pos-
sible Russian nuclear coercion and on the other to 
avoid its being compelled to develop its own 
nuclear deterrent. 
263. In the past, France has stressed the inde-
pendence of its nuclear deterrent and the role of 
the latter in the protection of its national territory. 
It could be argued that France's commitment to 
building a European defence identity might be 
called into question unless France were prepared 
to discuss the role of its nuclear forces within a 
wider European framework. 
264. The maintenance of maximum uncertainty 
over the possible use of French nuclear weapons, 
which is an essential aspect of any nuclear 
weapons doctrine, would certainly not satisfy 
those European allies who had come a long way 
towards agreement with the earlier French objec-
tive of building a European defence identity. 
265. Recently, it has been argued that technical 
and doctrinal rapprochements within Western 
Europe would consolidate the political legitimacy 
of nuclear deterrence. It might not be compatible 
with the political and strategic solidarity that 
Europe is seeking if nuclear weapons were based 
only on the territory of nuclear states. A French 
strategist has suggested closer links between 
France, the United Kingdom and Germany in the 
development of doctrine and nuclear delivery sys-
tems as ways of building this solidarity 30• 
266. One might question whether such co-ope-
ration should be restricted to these three nations, 
while in NATO it is occurring in a much wider 
framework in accordance with the Nassau and 
Athens agreements. 
267. Various options can be considered for Uni-
ted Kingdom/French nuclear protection of their 
non-nuclear European allies. 
30. Jean-Marie Guehenno, " L'avenir de la dissuasion 
nucleaire ", in Ministere de la Defense, Un nouveau debat 
strategique : Actes du colloque de Paris, 29th-30th Septem-
ber, 1st October 1992 (Paris : Documentation Fran~aise, 
1993). 
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268. One is that both nations consider the secu-
rity of the other member states of Western Euro-
pean Union to be a vital interest. 
269. A second, seemingly logical option, is the 
application of Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty which stipulates that " ... the other high 
contracting parties will ( ... ) afford the party so 
attacked all the military and other aid and assis-
tance in their power ". 
270. A third would be for the European Union 
completely to absorb the existing national auto-
nomy and sovereignty of the member states. 
However, at present this seems a somewhat 
utopian idea. 
271. The French Defence Minister, Fran~ois 
Leotard, may have been hinting at this possibility 
when he stated in a recent interview 31 • 
" I believe Europe is one of the fundamen-
tal issues of the late 20th century. However, 
I also believe that control over nuclear wea-
ponry should stay in the hands of nations. It 
is essentially management of fear and as 
such cannot be on a shared basis, even if its 
use is not intended ... At present there are 
only national powers. Who knows if the 
day will come when there will be a single, 
legitimate political power in Europe? I 
hope so but I cannot see it happening in the 
near future ... Use, or even management, of 
nuclear weapons can only be through a 
highly centralised system, under the res-
ponsibility of a single leadership. " 
272. On the subject of the possible extension of 
deterrence to oilier countries, the minister obser-
ved: 
" The major lesson I learned from General 
de Gaulle is that a nation's leaders alone are 
able to evaluate where their country's 
highest interest lies and when that interest 
is threatened. In the last resort a nation has 
no friends. " 
273. In the light of this reversion to the old Gaul-
list views, as though no developments at all had 
occurred in European integration since the 1960s, 
one might wonder what are the alternatives: co-
operation in NATO, supported by American 
extended deterrence, avowedly losing credibility 
on account of the increasing reluctance on the part 
of United States political and military authorities 
to use such weapons, or the tenuous hope that, at 
the moment of truth, France will regard you as a 
friend. 
274. It should be observed that individual 
nations, even if closely linked in the framework of 
the Maastricht Treaty, can only really share a cre-
dible declared policy of nuclear deterrence if there 
31. Le Quotidien, 6th March 1994. 
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is a homogeneous political union and a common 
political authority. In w~~h c~se, it "':ould appear 
inevitable that all part1c1patmg natiOns should 
share financial responsibility for the maintenance 
of the nuclear forces required for deterrence. 
275. As to Anglo-French nuclear co-operation: 
when, in October 1993, the United Kingdom deci-
ded to cancel its participation in the development 
of air-to-surface long-range missile, arguing that 
the new Trident SLBM could be used in a secon-
dary sub-strategic role, it was stated that tentative 
work would continue on designs for a possible 
future missile system that could result in an 
Anglo-French strategic weapon. 
276. It should also be borne in mind that the 
French concept of the development of a Europ.ean 
defence identity is not fully shared by the Uruted 
Kingdom. Although France may be developi~g 
the idea of a joint Western European deterrent m 
that framework based on French and British 
nuclear forces, it should not be forgotten that at 
this juncture the British have ~ radical Atl~ticist 
view of nuclear deterrence which does not m fact 
allow for any decoupling of their nuclear forces or 
strategies from those of the United States. 
277. In the British view, NATO's Nuclear Plan-
ning Group already provides the appropriate mul-
tilateral consultation forum for nuclear deterrence 
protecting Western Europe. 
278. There are indeed some major differences 
between the positions of British and French 
nuclear forces. Both nations stress the independent 
character of these nuclear forces, but the United 
Kingdom has committed them to NATO, which 
means that they are in the framework of the single 
integrated operational plan, provi~g an auto~a­
tic deterrent for all non-nuclear allies. The Uruted 
Kingdom " would regard her own vital interests at 
stake in any attack upon an alliance member" 32• 
France does not participate in the work of NATO's 
Nuclear Planning Group and, notwithstanding 
recent suggestions made by President Mitterrand 
and former Defence Minister Pierre Joxe, official 
policy is that France's nuclear forces remain under 
national command, at the disposal only of the Head 
of State and intended to protect France's national 
territory and vital interests. 
279. It has been rightly said that, political consi-
derations apart, it will not be easy for the United 
Kingdom to establish close practical co-operation 
with France in nuclear matters because its nuclear 
forces, soon to consist exclusively of four Trident 
submarines, are almost completely dependent on 
the United States. Until now, therefore, British 
nuclear forces came relatively cheap. 
280. Any co-operative Franco-British programme 
to develop a new nuclear weapon will be very 
32. Malcolm Ritkind, Paris, 30th September 1992. 
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expensive and it is debatable whether it could be 
achieved without testing. 
281. In other words it can be argued that the 
United States' agreements with the former Soviet 
Union and its moves towards a comprehensive 
test-ban treaty are in practice blocking the deve-
lopment of an effective European nuclear force. 
282. No European nuclear co-operation would 
be feasible without close German involvement. 
Purely Franco-British nuclear co-operation might 
be experienced by Germany as a force that had to 
be counter-balanced, and there would be strong 
pressure against such co-operation unless the Ger-
mans were invited to participate in one way or 
another. 
283. There is no other way of establishing such 
co-operation than by small incremental ste~s. qne 
of these might be to create a nuclear co-ordmation 
body, operating at European level, with the Ger-
mans participating and possibly in contact with 
the United States. 
X. Third country proliferators 
284. As is well known, there are a number of 
states which are not official nuclear weapon states 
and are either possessors of nuclear weapons or 
have the ability to assemble them quickly. Of 
these states, only Israel is believed to possess a 
nuclear arsenal of any size (between 50 and 300 
nuclear weapons) including ballistic missile capa-
bilities. India and Pakistan are both believed to 
have the ability to assemble nuclear weapons 
quickly in a crisis. India has a well-advanced bal-
listic missile development programme and has 
performed test launches of intermediate- and 
short-range ballistic missiles. Pakistan is believed 
to have acquired missile technologies and mate-
rials from China. • 
285. Iran has been accused of having a clandes-
tine nuclear weapon programme. After the Gulf 
war, Iraq's nuclear weapon design and testing 
facilities, as well as its key missile production 
equipment, were destroyed in accordance with 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 687 
and 715. 
286. At present, the problems with North 
Korea over its secret nuclear weapons pro-
gramme have not yet been solved. This country 
is also a manufacturer of ballistic missiles and a 
major supplier of such to countries in the deve-
loping world. 
287. Apart from the countries mentioned above, 
a number of other states may feel tempted to 
develop or acquire their own nuclear we~pons 
capability and the appropriate means of delivery. 
As is argued elsewhere in this report, it is gener-
ally admitted that none of the existing non-proli-
feration regimes will be able to prevent them from 
attaining their objective from the moment they 
devote sufficient financial resources and zeal to 
this task. 
XI. Non-proliferation regimes 
288. Of the existing non-proliferation regimes 
which are of particular importance for nuclear non-
proliferation, the following should be mentioned: 33 
(a) Treaty on the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons (NPT) 
289. In the 1960s, it was becoming increasingly 
clear that the spread of nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes could also easily lead to a pro-
liferation of nuclear weapon capabilities which 
could not be controlled adequately by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), estab-
lished in 1956. 
290. In order to check this technology prolifera-
tion, a large number of countries signed the treaty 
on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, estab-
lished in 1968, which came into effect in 1970 and 
according to which: 
" the nuclear ' have-nots ' promised to forgo 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons in return 
for a commitment by the nuclear ' haves ' to 
make available nuclear-related technology 
which would help them to develop peaceful 
nuclear energy (Article IV). The non-
nuclear weapon states further had to conclu-
de an arrangement with the IAEA for the 
employment of safeguards on all sources of 
fissionable material in their peaceful-use 
nuclear plants. These obligations are laid 
down in Articles I-ll of the treaty, which 
limit the so-called ' horizontal ' proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapon states, 
in turn, were obliged to pursue negotiations 
' in good faith ' to put a halt to the nuclear 
arms race, and to achieve complete nuclear 
disarmament (so-called 'vertical' non-pro-
liferation, see Article VI). " 34 
291. A review conference has since been held 
every five years in order to reassess the effective-
ness of the treaty's safeguard system. France and 
China, two of the five declared nuclear weapons 
states, which for different reasons refused to sign 
the NPT for many years, finally acceded to the 
treaty on 3rd August and 9th March 1992, respec-
tively. 
33. For a succinct review of all existing non-proliferation 
regimes, see Peter van ham, Managing non-proliferation 
regimes in the 1990s, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
1993. 
34. Peter van Ham, Managing non-proliferation regimes in 
the 1990s, page 13. 
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292. On the other hand, serious questions have 
been raised about the NPT compliance of China, 
Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya and South Africa. 
In March 1993 North Korea became the first 
country to announce its intention to withdraw 
from the NPT 35 • 
293. The NPT system of IAEA safeguards has 
been essential to deter potential proliferators by 
increasing the risk of detection of the diversion of 
nuclear-related material and it remains a sine qua 
non for commercial nuclear trade since it estab-
lishes confidence in the recipient state's peaceful 
intentions with its nuclear programme. 
294. In 1970, a special non-proliferation treaty 
exports committee was established (the so-called 
Zangger Committee) and a register was agreed, 
specifying items which should be regarded as 
equipment and material designed or prepared for 
manufacturing nuclear weapons ("trigger list"). 
In this framework, exporters must insist upon a 
non-explosive use assurance given by the reci-
pient state, the material must be subject to IAEA 
safeguards and be re-exported only under similar 
conditions. 
295. Recent events in Iraq and North Korea, 
both signatory states to the NPT and IAEA, have 
clearly demonstrated that the existing internatio-
nal regime does not prevent clandestine nuclear 
weapon activities. 
296. In accordance with Article X.2 of the NPT, 
a conference will be convened in 1995 in order to 
decide whether the NPT will be extended for an 
additional period of time, whether it will be conti-
nued indefinitely, or whether it will simply expire. 
This conference will also review the treaty's 
implementation. 
297. The 1995 conference is considered to be of 
the greatest importance since the NPT is the key-
stone of the whole non-proliferation regime in 
existence. Negotiations on an extension of the 
treaty will be complicated because of the fact that 
many issues are involved. Many third world coun-
tries are not satisfied with their share of the politi-
cal bargain upon which the NPT was based: 
peaceful nuclear technology in exchange for a 
pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons. They 
argue that nuclear technology transfer has to be 
restricted and that the nuclear weapon states 
should stop modernising their nuclear weapons 
arsenals. They may make an extension of the NPT 
conditional upon. the conclusion of a comprehen-
sive test ban treaty. 
298 Connected with the debate on a compre-
hensive test ban treaty is the demand by many 
countries for a commitment by the nuclear 
weapon states to a timetable for their nuclear 
disarmament. For obvious reasons, this demand 
35. SIPRI yearbook 1992, page 56. 
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may come from Ukraine, Kazakhstan, other CIS 
republics and the Baltic states, but both Japan and 
Germany may also be interested. 
299. It should further be noted that many non-
nuclear states will seek security assurances from 
the nuclear weapons states either of a negative 
character (commitments not to use, or threaten to 
use their nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
states) or a positive character (commitments to 
come to the aid of a non-nuclear weapon state 
threatened by nuclear weapons or against which 
nuclear weapons have been used). 
300. Although in February 1992 the IAEA 
Board of Governors significantly improved the 
operation of the IAEA safeguards system, new 
attempts will be made to introduce new safe-
guarding concepts. 
301. With the United States now having worked 
out a doctrine for the use of military force against 
the nuclear facilities of proliferant states, this 
issue will certainly be discussed in connection 
with the implementation of Article N. 
302. The 1995 NPT extension and review confe-
rence takes place in an era with more opportuni-
ties than ever before for greater international col-
laboration to prevent nuclear proliferation. 
Nuclear arms control and non-proliferation activi-
ties are so closely linked that they can hardly be 
dealt with separately. The role of the IAEA could 
be enhanced, not only in controlling an extended 
safeguard system, but also in safeguarding fissile 
materials recovered from dismantled nuclear 
warheads and maybe even in providing secreta-
riat, verification and inspection services for state 
parties to a comprehensive test ban treaty. 
(b) Missile technology control regime (MTCR) 
303. The MTCR is an informal agreement, estab-
lished in 1987 by the G-7 countries in order to 
control the exportation of missile technologies 
and major sub-systems 36• Later a number of other 
industrialised countries joined this agreement 
while others pledged to observe its spirit and 
guidelines. The main reasons for setting up the 
MTCR was that the acquisition of missile systems 
or the technology to develop them will greatly 
enhance the military power and effectiveness of 
proliferant nations since it provides them with a 
means to deliver their weapons of mass destruc-
tion. 
304. It is recognised that the MTCR, as other 
existing export control regimes, does not provide 
a leak-proof protection against the proliferation of 
missile technology. The regime has several weak 
points such as its limited membership, the fact 
that missile technology is an issue much less tain-
36. Document 1305, paragraph 71 et seq. 
32 
ted than nuclear technology, and the divergent 
export controllegislations of those states adhering 
to it 
305. It should also be mentioned that many 
third-world countries are perceiving the lack of 
access to modem missile technologies as another 
symptom of paternalism by the developed world, 
which is denying them a means of further econo-
mic and industrial development. 
(c) Comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) 
306. In October 1992, a law came into force in 
the United States mandating a permanent ban on 
all United States nuclear tests after 30th Septem-
ber 1996, " unless a foreign state conducts a 
nuclear test after that date ". The same legislation 
required the suspension of all United States 
nuclear tests from 1st October 1992 until at least 
1st July 1993, a suspension which has since been 
prolonged. The Clinton administration has deci-
ded not to resume testing and is now actively pur-
suing the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban 
treaty. 
307. The administration was directed to submit 
to Congress a schedule for the resumption of test 
talks with Russia and a" plan for achieving a mul-
tilateral ban on the testing of nuclear weapons by 
30th September 1996 ". A worldwide test ban 
could be an important instrument to thwart the 
development of new sophisticated nuclear arse-
nals by proliferant nations. 
308. It is noted that a first generation, relatively 
low-yield nuclear weapon can be developed 
without testing, provided that the combination of 
a certain technological level, the necessary 
nuclear material and the determination to succeed 
are united. The development of more sophistica-
ted nuclear weapons, however, does require a 
high or very high technological level and testing. 
309. After a first commitment made by Presi-
dent Gorbachev in October 1991 not to conduct 
nuclear tests for one year, this Russian morato-
rium has been extended by President Yeltsin. 
310. In France, President Mitterrand had 
announced a unilateral moratorium on nuclear 
testing in April 1992 which was confirmed by 
Prime Minister Balladur on 14th February 1994. 
Although this decision has often since been criti-
cised, in particular by those who support the right-
wing government now in power, France has pled-
ged to continue its moratorium for as long as the 
United States and Russia refrain from testing. 
France is certainly prepared to co-operate in the 
establishment of a CTBT which it considers to be 
an important tool in non-proliferation efforts. It 
has emphasised that such a treaty should then be 
both universal and verifiable. Advocates of resu-
med testing argue that it would allow improve-
ments to be made in safety, security and reliabi-
lity and new warheads for future delivery systems 
and a broader spectrum of nuclear weapons to be 
developed, including high-precision lower-yield 
weapons which some consider to be essential for 
a more selective and discriminate approach in 
France's nuclear doctrine. It is also argued that 
France does not yet have the extensive computer 
simulation programmes which enabled the United 
States to renounce testing. It is highly unlikely, 
however, that France will resume testing before 
the presidential elections in 1995 and even after 
that date such a decision would be difficult to 
defend for any of President Mitterrand's possible 
successors 37 • 
311. China conducted several nuclear tests in 
1992 and 1993, but it has stated that it was willing 
to discuss nuclear test issues with all the members 
of the Conference on Disarmament. On the other 
hand, one of the conditions for its participation in 
a comprehensive test ban treaty is that states with 
the largest nuclear arsenals should take the lead in 
" halting testing, production and deployment and 
drastically reducing those weapons 38 ". Beijing 
would be prepared to participate after " tangible 
progress " by those states. 
(d) Cocom 
312. In the autumn of 1993, it was decided that 
Cocom would cease to exist on 31st March 1994, 
being succeeded by an organisation with a broa-
der membership and a changed mandate. Cocom 
had become the target of increased criticism, even 
among its own members, who in the absence of 
the former cold war consensus were not prepared 
to maintain its complicated and laborious export 
control system while many new and important 
export markets were developing in formerly pros-
cribed countries. 
313. The objective is now to create a new organ-
isation before the end of 1994, with an extended 
membership and concentrating on a proliferation 
control agenda. Efforts are being made to regula-
te the transfer to proliferant nations of dual-use 
technologies, which contribute greatly to the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction and their 
delivery systems. Cocom's old and somewhat 
extensive proscribed item list will very probably 
be replaced by an enhanced " super-core " list of 
8 to 10 technologies, transfer of which will be 
prohibited to an agreed list of countries. Apart 
from the old Cocom member states, the new 
organisation might include Austria, Finland, Ire-
land, Sweden, Switzerland and New Zealand. 
Efforts are being made also to include China, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Russia and 
Slovakia. 
37. See also Chapter VIII (b) of the present report. 
38. SIPRI year book 1992, page 564. 
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314. Even if the efforts to transform the former 
Cocom into a new non-proliferation organisation 
are welcomed, there can be little doubt that the 
new regime will be far less effective for many 
obvious reasons, some of which are mentioned 
below. 
315. If the objective is to include all the leading 
suppliers, it will be difficult to reach agreement on 
the list of proscribed countries. 
316. Abandoning the Cocom consensus rule on 
approving technology transfers will considerably 
weaken the control system. In the future, national 
discretion will determine whether an item not on 
the very limited " super-core " list is to be trans-
ferred. The new organisation will not be able to 
exercise a veto over intended export activities of 
its members; there will only be prior consulta-
tion. 
317. One of the criteria for membership of the 
new organisation is that national export-control 
systems must meet a minimum standard similar to 
that required for Cocom member states. It should 
be noted, however, that many of the former War-
saw Pact countries which ought and are willing to 
be members of the new organisation in fact do not 
meet its requirements for a strict export-control 
system. Even though the Cocom co-ordination 
forum and NACC have been helpful in improving 
their export-control administration, it is likely that 
some of these states will constitute a weak link in 
the new framework. 
318. It should also be noted that developing 
countries are criticising the establishment of a 
new multilateral control regime because it might 
limit their access to dual-use technologies. This is 
considered to be one of the issues in North-South 
relations that will complicate negotiations in the 
1995 NPT review and extension conference. 
319. Moreover, the new independent republics 
of the former Soviet Union consider the export of 
dual-use technologies, in particular to developing 
countries, as one of the few methods available for 
converting their defence industries and improving 
their economies. 
XII. Conclusions 
(a) Do we still need nuclear weapons? 
320. With the development of the nuclear 
weapons policies of the four nuclear weapons 
powers involved in Europe's security, what 
should be the conclusions as regards the role and 
future of these weapons in Europe? 
321. Even if some argue to the contrary, one 
can but recall that during the many years of the 
cold war nuclear weapons played an important 
role in maintaining a balance in Europe. It may 
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have been a balance of terror, but, because of the 
risk of degeneration into a nuclear exchange, it 
prevented any of the parties involved from 
embarking upon a military adventure in order to 
change the status quo. Mass destruction was 
considered to be a real possibility and therefore 
the risk was unacceptable. Over the years, the old 
adversaries had learned the rules of the nuclear 
weapons game and in the later years of the cold 
war they felt confident and comfortable enough 
to agree on the withdrawal of tactical nuclear 
weapons and the limitation of strategic arms. 
Nuclear deterrence worked well in relations bet-
ween East and West and there is no reason to 
believe that the present or possibly even a future 
leadership in Russia with different views will not 
act in accordance with the many tacit understan-
dings that have become part and parcel of deter-
rence between the traditional nuclear powers and 
which have been extremely effective. 
322. Indeed, this alone is good reason to 
argue that the members of the Atlantic Alliance 
will have to maintain their nuclear forces as an 
insurance policy to protect them against any pos-
sible resurgence of aggressive imperialism. Like-
wise, Russia will want to maintain its nuclear 
forces as tangible proof of its status in the world 
and as a hedge against any possible feeling of 
being blackmailed by other nuclear states, such as 
China for example. 
323. Another reason for nuclear weapon states 
to keep a nuclear arsenal is that they do not have 
the option of returning to a condition of pre-
nuclear innocence. It should be emphasised here 
that none of the existing non-proliferation 
regimes nor even a comprehensive test ban treaty 
can prevent the acquisition by third countries of 
ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons or other 
weapons of mass destruction. 
324. The possession of somewhat reduced but 
still relatively large arsenals of nuclear weapons 
by the official nuclear weapon states would at 
least prevent a situation where the acquisition of a 
small number of nuclear weapons would provide 
a nation with a disproportionate influence in its 
region or even in the world. 
325. Does the possession of nuclear weapons 
protect against proliferation to third countries? 
326. The answer cannot be a straightforward 
" yes " or " no ". As stated above, the possession 
of a reasonably large number of nuclear weapons 
can deter a third country from the acquisition of a 
substantial nuclear arsenal be it only for reasons 
of cost. A third country which has acquired 
nuclear weapons could be deterred from using 
them in a crisis or conflict because, in accordance 
with the classical doctrine of deterrence, it would 
be threatened with such destructive retaliation 
that the risk of unacceptable losses would be grea-
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ter than the advantages it might gain from aggres-
sion. There is no guarantee, however, that third 
countries will react according to the rules of the 
game established between the superpowers. Alto-
gether, however, it may be concluded that the pos-
session of a nuclear arsenal may play a positive 
role in protection against third country prolifera-
tors. 
327. On the other hand, the question arises of 
whether nuclear weapons should be used against 
third countries if they threaten to resort to 
weapons of mass destruction. Most strategists 
argue that modem, highly-sophisticated conven-
tional precision weapons could do whatever is 
necessary in such circumstances. It is thought 
here that the development of low-yield, high-pre-
cision nuclear weapons for such purposes is not 
desirable, particularly since it would lower the 
nuclear threshold in the event of a conflict. 
328. It is essential that Europe draw the conse-
quences of the changes wrought in the world 
nuclear landscape 39 which can be described as 
follows: 
(i) all nuclear weapons come into the 
strategic echelon; 
(ii) tactical and infra-strategic nuclear 
weapons disappear in favour of high-
precision, high-yield conventional 
weapons (c.f. the Gulf war); 
(iii) remaining nuclear weapons will no 
longer be deployed in any large num-
bers in external theatres of operations. 
The trend is for nuclear arms, other 
than easily deployable nuclear subma-
rine missile-launchers and airborne 
systems, to be returned to their natio-
nal territories; 
( iv) the evolution of doctrines is towards 
minimal nuclear deterrence; this evo-
lution could be slowed down by the 
politically unstable and conservative 
position of Russia; 
(v) for reasons of cost and strategic uncer-
tainty, all nuclear weapons countries 
are tending to suspend development 
and production of new nuclear wea-
pons systems. 
(b) Towards a European nuclear deten-ent 
329. Europe cannot remain indifferent to these 
fundamental changes in the nuclear landscape, 
although it seems to have little interest in the 
matter for the present. Is this because it is 
playing for time in order first to analyse the evo-
39. See also: Memento, L'Europe et la securite nationale 
1993, GRIP, Brussels. 
lution of geostrategic balances, because it is 
seeking to maintain the status quo, resting on its 
laurels, reluctant to jeopardise a minimal 
consensus achieved only with difficulty - or 
perhaps for a mixture of all these reasons? 
However, Europe must of necessity reach a 
decision in this matter. It would be unimagi-
nable for the European Union to define a com-
mon foreign and security policy and at the same 
time for France and Britain to continue to insist 
on defining their vital interests as they perceive 
them, in isolation, protected by their strike 
forces. Can one claim that the will exists to 
create a political Europe if the component states 
are to be denied the right to participate in the 
development of the doctrine of deterrence which 
is supposed to assure their common protection? 
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330. The debate on the European nuclear deter-
rent will be the moment of truth in the construc-
tion of a European political union. 
331. Apart from France and Great Britain which 
are nuclear powers in their own right, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands have for 
decades undertaken nuclear missions on behalf of 
the Atlantic Alliance. For this reason your Rap-
porteur is convinced that the progressive develop-
ment of a European nuclear strategy by a WEU 
strategic studies group can and must succeed. The 
task will be a long, awkward and arduous one, but 
what was possible in the Nuclear Planning Group 
of the Atlantic Alliance should also be possible 
within WEU for on it depend the security and 
external credibility of the European Union. 
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APPENDIX I 
Status of non-US aid for former Soviet weapon complex 
30th December 1993 
International 
International Science and Technology Center 
Britain 
250 weapon containers, 20 transport vehicles 
Finland 
International Science and Technology Center 
France 
nuclear safety aid 
Germany 
offer to Ukraine: dispose of liquid fuel 
Italy 
safety equipment for Russia 
Japan 
Framework agreement 
- Assist in destruction of liquid fuel 
- Plan for plutonium disposal 
-Joint research with Russia on a breeder reactor 
- Breeder reactor to use excess plutonium 
- Use new plutonium reactor 
- Demilitarise plutonium 
(Source: The Arms Control Reporter 1993-1994). 
37 
Amount 
(in millions) 
$70 
£30 
NIA 
FF160 
DM20 
$6 
$100 
NIA 
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APPENDIX IT 
Soviet/Russian strategic forces - warheads by weapons system 
Soviet CIS Projected Projected Russian Russian September 1990 January 1994 START STARTll 
ICBMs 
SS-11 326 0 0 0 
SS-13 40 0 0 0 
SS-17 188 160 0 0 
SS-18 3 080 2900 1540 0 
SS-19 1800 1680 630 105 
SS-24 Silo 560 560 lOO 0 
SS-24Rail 330 360 330 0 
SS-25 Road-mobile 288 405 500 500 
SS-25 Mod 2 Road mobile 0 0 50 lOO 
SS-25 Mod 2 Silo 0 0 50 300 
Total 6 612 6065 3 200 1005 
SLBMs 
SS-N-6 192 0 0 0 
SS-N-8 280 64 0 0 
SS-N-17 12 0 0 0 
SS-N-18 672 672 528 528 
SS-N-20 1200 1200 720 720 
SS-N-23 448 448 448 448 
Total 2 804 2384 1696 1696 
Bombers 
Bear-AIB 17 0 0 0 
Bear-G 92 0 0 0 
Bear-H (6) 162 162 162 162 
Bear-H (16) 912 912 576 576 
Blackjack 180 300 60 60 
Total 1363 1374 798 798 
Total 10779 9 823 5 694 3 499 
United States strategic forces - warheads by weapons system 
September 1990 January 1994 START STARTll (Projected) (Projected) 
ICBMs 
~eacekeeper 500 500 500 0 
Minuteman Ill 1500 1500 900 500 
Minutemanll 450 200 0 0 
Total 2450 4200 1400 500 
SLBMs 
Poseidon (C-3) 1920 0 0 0 
Trident I (C-4) 3 072 1920 1536 768 
Trident 11 (D-5) 768 1152 1920 960 
Total 5 760 3 072 3456 1728 
Bombers 
B-lB 1520 1504 1504 0 
B-2 0 16 320 320 
B-52H 1860 1860 940 940 
B-52G 1056 0 0 0 
Total 4436 3 380 2 764 1260 
Total 12646 8 652 7620 3488 
(Source: Arms Control Association, Washington D.C.) 
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